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Abstract
A framework for the analysis of model selection issues is presented. The framework separates model selection
into two dimensions: the model-complexity dimension and the model-space dimension. The model-complexity
dimension pertains to how the complexity of a single model interacts with its scoring by standard evaluation
measures. The model-space dimension pertains to the interpretation of the totality of evaluation scores obtained.
Central to the analysis is the concept of evaluation coherence, a property which requires that a measure not
produce misleading model evaluations. Of particular interest is whether model evaluation measures are misled by
model complexity. Several common evaluation measures — apparent error rate, the BD metric, and MDL scoring
— are analyzed, and each is found to lack complexity coherence. These results are used to consider arguments for
and against the Occam razor paradigm as it pertains to overﬁt avoidance in model selection, and also to provide
an abstract analysis of what the literature refers to as oversearch.
1. Introduction
The machine learning and statistics literature contains much analysis of how such factors as the complexity
of models, the number of models evaluated, and the distributions of true models and relevant features affect
model selection and error bound estimation. In this article, we propose that the questions are clariﬁed when one
makes explicit a separation of model selection factors into two dimensions: the model-complexity dimension and
the model-space dimension. Intuitively, the model-complexity dimension pertains to how the complexity of a
single model affects the distribution of its evaluation scores, while the model-space dimension pertains to how the
characteristics of model space affect the interpretation of the totality of evaluation scores.
Wepostulateapristine, limitingcasesetofassumptionswhichreﬂectsanidealizationofmanyhigh-dimensional
applications (e.g., microarray, proteomic, and many other biomedically-inspired analyses) currently the subject
of intense investigations. In such an environment, the number of features is virtually limitless, and most have no
correlation with the class to be predicted. Our idealization facilitates the study of central issues, and the results
are argued to provide insight into more realistic settings in which the assumptions are relaxed.
We develop a notion of measure coherence. Coherence means, roughly, that the model evaluation measure
behaves in a rational way when used to compare models. Of particular interest is the question of whether measures
exhibit an a priori bias for or against models of high complexity as compared to simple models. We study the
question in the abstract, as well as by applying the analysis to standard data likelihood, to the apparent error rate
evaluation measure (both with and without cross validation), to the Bayesian-Dirichlet (BD) metric, and to the
minimum description length (MDL) scoring function.
We present both analytical and numerical results demonstrating lack of coherence for the error rate measure
(with a bias toward more complex models), and for MDL and the BD metric (with a bias toward less complex
models). We interpret these results in the context of such previous research as that presented in [1, 2, 13, 16, 17,
20, 23, 26, 30]. Our analysis is enabled by the separation of the model-complexity dimension from the model-
space dimension: issues that often have been attributed to model space or to model search are now seen to be
directly rooted in the non-coherence of the measure.
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1In our ﬁnal section, we brieﬂy visit the model-space dimension. Here, we assume a coherent evaluation is
used, and hence any issues that might arise are attributable solely to model space and search characteristics. Of
primary interest here is the calculation of the a priori probability of selecting the true model M∗ from amongst a
large collection of random models. We calculate the a priori probability that M∗ is selected when correct posterior
evaluation is employed, and consider also the effect on the probability of selecting M∗ of the number of models
evaluated. This latter results is in contrast to oversearch results such as those of Quinlan and Cameron-Jones [20],
demonstrating that when coherent evaluations are employed the oversearch phenomenon does not occur.
Critically, most of the conclusions reached are independent of distributional details of the actual true model
M∗, and of how the true model is distributed in model space. In particular, we identify model selection biases that
are not dependent on a predisposition for truth taking one form (e.g., simple) over another (e.g., complex).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of some of the related
literature on model complexity and model selection, and introduces our intuitive arguments for separating model
selection issues along the two dimensions of model complexity and the model space. Beginning in Section 3,
we explore by formal means the two dimensions. Section 3 deﬁnes measure coherence and views standard data
likelihood in these terms. Section 4 demonstrates the non-coherence of apparent error rate, BD, and MDL. Section
5 considers model space issues, including an analysis of the probability of selecting the true model as a function
of the number of models evaluated and the number of models in the space. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions
and indicates several avenues for future work.
2. Model Complexity and the Model Space
2.1 Related Work
Schaffer [23] highlights that any selection bias toward simple models — such as overﬁt avoidance — is
justiﬁed only by a prior judgement that simple is more likely. Much of what is presented here is in agreement with
such results. However, the results presented here open another issue. While Schaffer’s analysis is indisputable
when a coherent evaluation is applied (such as model posterior or likelihood), we demonstrate here that as a result
of properties inherent in many evaluation measures employed in practice, a bias may in fact exist for certain model
complexities over others, independent of prior distributional assumptions on model complexity. That is, for some
common model evaluation measures, complexity bias is present, independent of what the actual true model M∗
can be, and with what probability.
The seminal work of Blumer, et. al. [2] relates generalization error bounds to model complexity. The more
complex is a hypothesis that is used to encode the training labels, the weaker is the generalization error bound that
is allocated to the hypothesis. There is a certain similarity between this result and the non-coherence of apparent
error rate which we exhibit in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and of the DLdata term of MDL scoring considered in Section
4.4, insomuch as we demonstrate that complex models that ﬁt the training data well (and thus encode the training
labels) are more likely than simple models that ﬁt the training data equally well to be ”false” models, and hence
to not generalize to out-of-sample data. Our result, however, derives from the fact that many notions of ”ﬁt to
the data” lead to non-coherent measures which exhibit an evaluation bias on individual models that is based on a
model’s complexity.
PAC learning [28] with its many contributors and extensions (for example, [9] and [15] discuss extensions
related to several issues examined in the current work) is concerned primarily with bounding generalization error
achievable by polynomial time learning algorithms, and relate the number of training instances that must be
considered to the cardinality or the VC dimension [29] of the model space, or to the number of models evaluated.
Such issues ﬁt more closely into our model-space, rather than model-complexity, dimension, since our model-
complexity dimension is concerned not with characteristics of the space, but rather with the interaction between
the complexity of the individual models and the speciﬁcs of an evaluation measure. Even so, our model space
focus differs from that of these other works in that we are concerned with the probability of selecting the true
model M∗ based on a coherent evaluation and number of models present, rather than on bounding the expected
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in which the number of training instances is far too small for error bounds to be meaningful, but where we still
wish to know what search and evaluation procedure is best, and also to know when we are in a situation where the
identiﬁcation by any means of the true model is hopelessly improbable.
We note that Blum and Langford [1] recently presented an elegant framework for unifying PAC bounds with
MDL model complexity.
Kearns et. al. [13] studies complexity classes of boolean ”step” functions and experiments with different
procedures for selecting the appropriate hypothesis complexity to match a target step function. The measure-of-ﬁt
criterion used to evaluate hypothesis functions against sample points is akin to an apparent error rate evaluation,
and the need for such complexity adjustment is attributable to properties of the evaluation measure. Again, if
true posterior (whose computation includes a prior distribution over the complexity of the target function to be
selected) could be computed, there would be no grounds for an adjustment procedure of any sort. Since, however,
true posterior is rarely computable, there is ample practical motivation for the development of such procedures.
Empirical studies of speciﬁc procedures for pruning back decision trees motivated by overﬁt avoidance, similar
to what is performed in CART [3], include Murphy and Pazzani [17] and Webb [30], who reach rather different
conclusions. Many such studies employ evaluation criteria closely related to apparent error rate, reﬂecting criteria
often used in practice. One ultimate goal of the current work is to utilize a formulation such as the evaluation ratio
introduced in Section 3.1 toward developing quantitative means of trading model complexity against evaluation
quality in the context of speciﬁc, non-coherent evaluation measures.
Quinlan and Cameron-Jones’ oversearch analysis [20] claims that there is a point beyond which searching
the space of classiﬁcation trees appears to degrade generalization performance. Others [25] have pointed out
that this result could be due to the choice of evaluation function rather than being rooted in oversearch. Indeed,
our model space analysis, performed in its simple setting, proves that the more models evaluated by a coherent
measure the better the chance of selecting the true model. That is, oversearching is not a phenomenon that occurs
in this setting, and settings which extend it.
2.2 Two Dimensions of Analysis
Many researchers consider model selection while employing measures that are a priori biased in favor of
models of one complexity over those of another complexity in a sense that is formalized in Section 3. Intuitively,
the bias is that identical scores imply different actual posteriors for models differing only in their complexities.
Critically, this bias does not depend on a prior bias for a model of one complexity being truth more often than a
model of another complexity, nor on how many models of each complexity exist or are evaluated. Further, the
bias depends only minimally on speciﬁcs of the true model itself. Hence, while such work as Schaffer’s [23] and
Webb’s [30] correctly argue against the universality of the Occam razor paradigm for model selection by pointing
out that overﬁt avoidance is a distribution-on-truth bias that is only sometimes appropriate, we demonstrate here
that this conclusion hinges on the use of a coherent evaluation function. Apparent training-set error rate — cross
validated or not — with its bias for complex models, and MDL and, in some contexts, the BD metric, with their
bias for simple models, are classic examples of measures subject to an inherent complexity bias. We refer to this
issue of complexity biased evaluations as the model-complexity dimension of model selection, and the biased
evaluation measures themselves are said to lack coherence.
Orthogonal to the model-complexity dimension is the model-space dimension, which captures issues arising
from the fact that model space generally contains an enormous number of false (e.g., random) models, and gen-
erally contains more complex models than simple models. While the two complexity dimensions are orthogonal,
they often are blurred in the analysis, and the problems of a complexity biased evaluation are compounded by
a space in which a disproportionate number of the models are complex. Issues arising from directed search —
such as dependence between the models evaluated, and the fact that models found late in the search may be more
suspect than models found early — are additional complicating factors.
An exact mathematical analysis, while quite intractable in many practically important settings, applied with
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posterior is the deﬁnitive evaluation of a model, and, by deﬁnition, cannot exhibit bias of any type, including
bias for or against models of certain complexities, unless such a bias is explicitly encoded in the priors. While
this observation follows trivially from basic probability theory, practical application requires that we learn how to
transfer its consequences to situations in which true posterior cannot feasibly be computed. Even so, one immedi-
ate implication of our analysis is that the afore mentioned issues such as model complexity biases often observed
in the literature cannot arise when proper evaluations are used, yet many published analyses place fault inherently
on search schemes or on the nature of learning itself, rather than identifying that these problems stem uniquely
from imperfect model evaluation criteria. Once we put aside the distractions of biased evaluation or search, we
can identify the fundamental limitations of model selection: when there are too many false models relative to the
amount of data available, the probability that the true model M∗ has the highest posterior, conditioned on that
data, goes to zero. Unfortunately, this is a predicament that no amount of ingenuity in the design of evaluation
procedures or search algorithms can rectify. The best we can do is quantify the uncertainty.
3. Model Complexity and Coherence
3.1 Coherence Properties of Measures
Model posterior Pr{M truth | d} is the quintessential evaluation criterion and, when it can be computed and
applied to model selection, many of the issues examined in this work are, by deﬁnition, accounted for. But,
typically, model posterior cannot be computed exactly, and here we examine the consequences of other model
evaluation measures, speciﬁcally highlighting the fact that many common measures are inappropriately affected
bymodelcomplexity. Weillustratebymeansofaprobabilitymodelofageneralandintuitiveform, andemphasize
at the outset that the conclusions drawn in no way are peculiar to any particular realization of this probability
model, such as the Bayesian networks and classiﬁcation trees considered throughout this article.
The probability model postulates that there is a universe U of features, and some subset PS ⊆ U of these
features is statistically correlated with the class variable, whose value is to be predicted. Such a probability model
can be viewed from the perspective of either a Bayesian network [6, 10, 18, 19] or of a classiﬁcation tree [3, 4].
When viewed as a Bayesian network, the probability model takes the form of the parent set classiﬁcation
network developed in [11]. Given the values of the parents of the class label, which has no children in such
networks, theclasslabelisrenderedstatisticallyindependentoftheremainingfeatures. Assumingthatthefeatures
and class label are binary, there are 2k states psi of the parent features (combinations of their binary values), and
with each psi there is a conditional probability distribution for the class label, specifying Pr{C = 1 | psi} and
Pr{C = 2 | psi} summing to 1.0. We allow for each psi, Pr{C = 1 | psi} to be any value in [0,1]. When this
conditional probability is 0.0 or 1.0, the class label is functionally determined by the parent state; otherwise, the
relationship is probabilistic. One can also think of a probabilistic relationship as a functional one in which the
value of the class label with some probability is altered by noise. For example, to capture a situation in which
the class label is functionally determined to be 1 when the parent state is ps, but noise ﬂips the label to 2 with
probability0.1, onewouldspecifyPr{C=1| ps}=0.9. Ofcourse, probabilisticrelationshipwithothersemantics
can be so modelled as well.
In addition to the Bayesian network realization, one can think of this probability model as a homogeneous
classiﬁcation tree, in which only a subset of the universe of features affects the classiﬁcation. The tree is homoge-
neous in the sense that each root-to-leaf path contains the same sequence of features, and thus each combination
of parent feature values in the Bayesian network parent set model corresponds to a path through the classiﬁcation
tree. The height of the tree is equal to the number k of parents in the Bayesian network model, and the number
2k of leaves is equal to the number of states of the k parents. We will alternately view a model as a classiﬁcation
tree or a Bayesian network, depending on the analysis we wish to perform. Viewing models as classiﬁcation
trees facilitates comparisons with research (for example, [17, 20, 23, 30]) where apparent error rate and related
measures on tree models are studied, while viewing models as Bayesian networks allows the natural inclusion in
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of [10, 26], and also of MDL-based measures as considered in [6, 7, 14]. As [4] demonstrates, a classiﬁcation
tree in fact can be treated directly within the Bayesian framework as well.
In general, formal deﬁnitions will be presented in the Bayesian network terminology, with translations made
to classiﬁcation tree terminology when appropriate. As such, a model M has two components: M =< G,q >,
where G is a network structure (that is, a directed acyclic graph, or DAG) and q is a distribution consistent with
the conditional independence assertions of G. In the context of this article, G is a parent set model, that is, each
feature in some subset PS of the universe of features (the parents) is the tail of a directed edge into the class label,
and G contains no other edges. Also in the context of this work, we take the consistency of q with G to require
that the parent set in G be a minimal set of features which renders the class label statistically independent in the
distribution q of the remaining features.
When we say a model M∗ =< G∗,q∗ > is the true model, this means our observed data set d is generated in
accordance with distribution q∗.
3.1.1 Distribution Assumptions and the Model Selection Problem
All features and the class label are binary, assuming values in {1,2}. We assume that the features (which do
not include the class label, which will not be referred to as a feature) are statistically independent and identically
distributed (iid), each taking a value in {1,2} with equal probability. Hence, all combinations of feature values
are equally likely within a case xi ∈ d.
We equate model complexity with the number of features on which the class label depends, i.e., the number
of parents in the Bayesian network. cardk denotes the set of all models with k parents. Members of cardk thus
have 2k parent states, or cells, on which the class label is conditioned in the network, and this also is the number
of parameters needed to describe the model. Thus, our measure of model complexity tracks with most model
complexity conventions (for example, MDL measures, as applied to Bayesian networks [6, 7, 14]) typically
considered. Note that the minimality assumption stated above implies that that sets cardk of models are not
nested, but, rather, are disjoint.
We postulate a model interaction that facilitates analysis and is the limiting case of many important applica-
tions having high dimensionality. We assume that model space is such that the parent sets of all models having
nonzero prior probability are disjoint. That is, no pair of models that can be truth with nonzero prior probabil-
ity share any features — the features of all models M other than M∗ are uncorrelated with each other and with
the class label. Such a model is said to be random. By the no correlation assumption, the event ”M not truth”
and ”M random” are equivalent, and (1 − Pr{M truth}) = Pr{M not truth} = Pr{M random}. Also
Pr{data d such that Pred(d) | M random} and Pr{data d such that Pred(d) | M not truth} are therefore log-
ically equivalent for any predicate Pred and will be used interchangeably. We will also abbreviate the event
”M not truth” to ”NOT M”.
The disjointness of features implies that, for each cardk, there is some (possibly enormous) number of disjoint
subsets of k features such that only the models over each of these subsets have nonzero prior probability. Further,
for distinct cardinalities k and k0, the nonzero prior probability models in cardk and cardk0 share no features.
These assumptions approximate the limiting case of high dimensional model spaces in which almost all features
are irrelevant and, importantly, any evaluation anomalies present under these assumptions will necessarily be
present in a more intricate space that contains any subspace having the properties that are postulated here.
The disjointness assumption further implies that only one q, which we often denote by G(q), is associated
with any network G, that is, for any graph G, at most one M =< G,q > has nonzero prior probability. We will
also write M(q) depending on context. The associated q in general is not known to the model evaluators, and how
the model evaluators depend on G(q), or on the distributions (e.g. Dirichlet priors) over the space Q of possible q
which they assume, will be a focus of the analyses in the sections which follow.
When we say that the prior distribution of models is uniform, we mean that any nonzero-prior network G
within this disjoint-feature subspace has equal probability of being selected as the true model. One can imagine
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accordance with G∗(q). The model selection problem is to compute EV(Mi,d) for some collection of nonzero-
prior models Mi and evaluation function EV, and decide how relatively likely is it that each Mi so evaluated is the
chosen model M∗ =< G∗,G∗(q) > that generated the observations in d. Our interest in this article is in evaluation
characteristics rather than search and, therefore, we abstract away the details of speciﬁc search algorithms by
assuming that a model of a speciﬁed complexity is chosen for evaluation by an oracle with equal probability from
among models with nonzero prior probability.
3.1.2 Measure Coherence
For a given scoring function EV(M,d), we consider for a pair M, M0 of models, the model posteriors condi-
tioned on the models achieving a particular pair of scores on the observed data d, i.e.,
Pr{M truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 } and
Pr{M0 truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 }
The conditioning events above each is the aggregation of data for which the given evaluations are obtained,
rather than the data itself. By evaluating with scoring function EV, we replace knowledge of d with knowledge
of the scores, i..e., we replace the data-speciﬁc posterior Pr{M truth | d} with the above aggregation of data di
based on a common EV score. The issue we wish to consider is, how well-behaved is the scoring function EV?
For example, assuming that (nonzero) model priors P(M) are all equal, if two models of differing complexities
score the same, are their posteriors the same? That is, is it the case that
Pr{M truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v }
= Pr{M0 truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v }
More generally, are models correctly ordered by the scores, or are scores inappropriately inﬂuenced, for example,
by model complexity?
We can study the above posteriors by studying the evaluation ratio
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v0}
(1)
When model priors P(Mi) are equal, it follows from Bayes Theorem (e.g., see Theorem 3.1 below), that the
posteriors are ordered as the ratios (1). That is, for every model pair M and M0 and every pair of simultaneously
achievable scores v and v0,
Pr{M truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
< Pr{M0 truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
if and only if
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v0}
<
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
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model priors are not necessarily equal, we can generalize our results in terms of movement from the model priors,
i.e., Bayes factor. We note further that the evaluation ratios (1), and hence model posteriors when model priors
are equal, are ordered as above if and only if the ratio
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}
is less than 1.0 (see Corollary 3.1). We choose to deﬁne coherence in terms of the evaluation ratio (1), rather than
directly in terms such a likelihood ratio, because the evaluation ratio better reveals an interdependence between
model scores that is central to much of the analysis which follows.
The following deﬁnition of coherence speciﬁes that an evaluation measure EV is coherent if and only if EV
orders models consistently with their evaluation ratios. EV maps M and d to the reals, and for some EV a small
score is good while for others a large score is good. We use v ≺ v0 to denote the total order on R in which v0 is a
better score than v. (When and only v = v, the pair is not ordered by ≺.)
Deﬁnition 3.1: EV is coherent if, for every pair of models M and M0, and every pair of simultaneously achievable
scores v and v0, we have v ≺ v0 if and only if
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v0}
<
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
Since the scores are simultaneously achievable, the denominators are non-zero. Notice that, taking v = v0, this
deﬁnition requires that
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v}
=
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v | M0 truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
for all model pairs M and M0 and simultaneously achievable score v.
As noted above, when model priors are uniform, the ordering of the ratios determines the ordering of the
posteriors.
Theorem 3.1: Assuming equal model priors, for any pair of models M and M0 and any simultaneously achievable
scores v and v0
Pr{M truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
< Pr{M0 truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
if and only if
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v0}
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Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
Proof: By Bayes Theorem
Pr{M truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
< Pr{M0 truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
if and only if
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth}∗P(M)
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and E(M0,d) = v0}
<
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}∗P(M0)
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and E(M0,d) = v0}
if and only if
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth}
< Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}
if and only if
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth} ∗ Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
< Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth} ∗ Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v0}
if and only if
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v0}
<
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
¤
Corollary 3.1: Let
R =
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v0}
R0 =
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
8be a pair of evaluation ratios. Then
R
R0 =
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M0 truth}
and, if model priors P(M) = P(M0),
R
R0 =
Pr{M truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
Pr{M0 truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
Proof: The results follow from application of the same standard identities used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. For
example, write the numerator Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth} of R as
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
¤
The presence in the denominator of the evaluation ratio (1) of the joint conditioning event
[M0 truth and EV(M0,d) = v0] suggests a lack of independence of the scores. Indeed, knowledge of the true
model’s identity and of its evaluation score may inﬂuence the distribution of scores of a random model, even
given our disjointness of model assumptions. This lack of independence is what necessitates consideration of the
”joint” evaluation ratio (1) rather than simpler formulations, such as a ”marginal” evaluation ratio
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M truth}
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | NOT M}
(2)
In general, marginal evaluations ratios tell us little about a measure. We can have non-coherence with respect
to marginal ratios and be coherent; we can have coherence with respect to marginal ratios and still have the
inconsistencies we are trying to avoid. We will see speciﬁc examples of such phenomena in later sections.
It is important to note that failure of coherence (in the < direction) anytime v = v0 implies that there exist d
such that models M and M0 score the same on d, but M0 has a higher posterior conditioned on full knowledge of
d. This follows because if the posteriors of M and M0 were the same for each d on which they score the same
v, then the posterior conditioned on the set of d’s in this intersection would necessarily be the same. Therefore,
failure of coherence with respect to a pair of model scores is sufﬁcient to imply a failure of coherence regardless
of how many model scores are conditioned on, since there is at least one d on which M and M0 achieve the
same score yet M0 has a higher posterior conditioned on full knowledge of this d. While the converse does not
necessarily hold (the deﬁnition of coherence can be satisﬁed yet a non-coherence exists when additional model
scores are conditioned on) our goal here generally is to exhibit the non-coherence of measures, requiring only the
pairwise violation. Further, the pairwise deﬁnition is practically appropriate since it reﬂects how model selection
procedures using an EV typically operate; rather than using full knowledge of d (e.g., synthesizing a collection of
many scores), they perform pairwise comparisons of model scores. What’s more, we will note in Section 3.2 that
likelihood — the one measure we identify as being coherent — is in fact coherent under even full knowledge of
d.
Coherencecanfailduetoanynumberofevaluationbiases. Ourprimaryinteresthereisthefailureofcoherence
due to complexity biases, for example, a bias in which a single complex model scoring well has more of a chance
9of being random (i.e., not truth) than does a single simple model scoring equally well. To study such issues, we
must formalize a sense in which models can be said to differ only in their complexity.
Deﬁnition 3.2: Distributions q and q0 associated with models M and M0 are homomorphic if they assign the same
set of conditional probabilities
{pri1 | psi is a parent cell and conditional class probability Pr{C = 1|psi} is assigned pri1}
and in the same proportions across the parent cells of the two models. (That is, the value pr1 is assigned to
Pr{C = 1|psi} for the same proportion of parent cells psi of M and M0 by the corresponding q and q0.) Models
M =< G,q > and M0 =< G0,q0 > are homomorphic if q and q0 are homomorphic. We say that homomorphic
models differ only in their complexity.
We shall consider the following issue. Suppose models Mk ∈ cardk and Mk0 ∈ cardk0 (k < k0) differ only in
their complexity. The question of complexity coherence is, for what evaluation measures are the evaluation ratios
ill-behaved on such pairs Mk and Mk0 of models? Thus, while coherence requires consistency of ratios for all
M and M0 model pairs, complexity coherence requires consistency only in such cases where model complexity
is the sole difference between models. In this sense, complexity coherence is a very minimal and reasonable
requirement for a measure to obey.
A violation of complexity coherence results in
Pr{d such that EV(Mk,d) = v | Mk truth}
Pr{d such that EV(Mk,d) = v | Mk0 truth and EV(Mk0,d) = v0}
>
Pr{d such that EV(Mk0,d) = v0 | Mk0 truth}
Pr{d such that EV(Mk0,d) = v0 | M truth and EV(M,d) = v}
for at least one pair of models Mk and Mk0 differing only in their complexity, and at least one pair of scores v and
v0 such that v≺v0 or v=v0. It follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 that a lack of complexity coherence implies
the posteriors are incorrectly ordered when model priors P(M) are uniform.
Corollary 3.2: Suppose model prior P(M) is uniform. If homomorphic Mk and Mk0 fail complexity coherence on
the pair of values v and v0, where v ≺ v0 or v = v0, then
Pr{Mk truth | d such that EV(Mk,d) = v and EV(Mk0,d) = v0}
> Pr{Mk0 truth | d such that EV(Mk,d) = v and EV(Mk0,d) = v0}
When the direction of inequality of the ratios is consistent for differing complexities — say the more complex
consistently has the lower ratio — a systematic bias is indicated for the (for example) more complex to score better
when it is not truth relative to when it is truth. Consequently, when such a non-complexity coherent evaluation
measure is used, we need to be more suspect of the score of a complex model, since it is more likely to be random
and less likely to be truth, when scores of simple and complex models are equal or near.
We emphasize that since we are considering single models of each complexity, the potential issues identiﬁed
are model-complexity issues, rather than of model-space issues, i.e., the potential evaluation anomalies do not
derive from the fact that there are more complex models than simple models in model space, nor from any other
propertiesofmodelspace, norfromanysearchbiasgoverningwhichmodelsareevaluated. Further—andperhaps
most importantly — the anomalies do not depend on any predisposition for truth taking the form of models of one
complexity over those of another.
103.2 Model Posterior and Data Likelihood
Data likelihood is a universally valid measure that yields posterior consistent evaluations with respect to
speciﬁed priors. Our primary motivations for considering here such a well-known concept as likelihood are to:
(a) review its exact computation in a simple model-evaluation setting; (b) derive closed forms for the distribution
of likelihood scores in this setting; (c) use the score distributions as illustration of the potential behaviors of a
coherent measure, which will both motivate further our deﬁnition of coherence and serve as contrast with the non-
coherent measure behaviors demonstrated in Section 4; and, (d) provide the necessary distributional machinery
for considering the model space issues treated in Section 5.
In the previous section, we considered quantities of the form
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0 | M truth}
and
Pr{M truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
In these quantities, the predicted and conditioning event [EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0] is a set {di} of
observations, all of whose members yield particular, common evaluation scores (v and v0) on the models M and
M0. This differs from predicting or conditioning on a particular observation d, which gives rise to the familiar
data likelihood Pr{d | M truth} or model posterior Pr{M truth | d}.
Likelihood score L(M,d) = Pr{d | M truth} is a sufﬁcient summary of d in the sense that likelihood scores
correctly rank the models by posterior, conditioned on d, assuming model priors are equal. Further, knowing the
likelihoodscoreL(Mi,d)ofeachMi ond, orknowingPr{d}, providesthenormalizationconstantfortransforming
likelihood to posterior and is equivalent to knowing d exactly with respect to computing posterior Pr{M | d}, that
is,
Pr{M | d} = Pr{M | L(Mi,d) for each Mi} = Pr{M | L(M,d), Pr{d}}
In terms of our characterization of evaluation measures, the key property of data likelihood is:
Fact 3.1: When model priors P(M) are uniform, the highest likelihood model evaluated on d has the highest pos-
terior for being truth conditioned on d. Further, the ordering of models by likelihood evaluated on d is consistent
with how probable the model is conditioned on d. That is, for all data d and models M and M0:
Pr{M truth | d} < Pr{M0 truth | d} if f L(M,d) < L(M0,d)
Proof: Self-evident. Posterior is proportional to likelihood when priors P(M) are uniform.
Fact 3.1 states a stronger property than what is required by our deﬁnition of coherence. The fact states that
the posterior ordering is consistent with likelihood for each individual d, whereas the coherence of measure EV
requires a consistent ordering only for aggregations of d according to EV scores. That is, it follows from Fact 3.1
that (when priors P(M) are equal)
Pr{M truth | d such that L(M,d) = v and L(M0,d) = v0}
< Pr{M0 truth | d such that L(M,d) = v and L(M0,d) = v0}
iff v < v0. This consistency, of course, is equivalent to the evaluation ratio (1) condition for coherence (see
Theorem 3.1).
We observe that these key properties of likelihood follow outside the treatment here of evaluation measures in
general and, consequently, do not depend on any of our model assumptions, such as the disjoint feature assump-
tions speciﬁed in Section 3.1.
11We observe also that for a non-coherent EV, we have, for some model pairs M and M0 and scores v and v0
Pr{M truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
> Pr{M0 truth | d such that EV(M,d) = v and EV(M0,d) = v0}
when EV(M,d) ≺ EV(M0,d). Hence, for at least some d
Pr{M truth | d} > Pr{M0 truth | d}
when EV(M,d) ≺ EV(M0,d), and Fact 3.1 fails to hold for non-coherent EV.
3.3 The Distribution of Likelihood Scores and Coherent Behavior
In this section, we analyze how likelihood scores L(M,d) are distributed for random and true models M. This
will illustrate why, in general, the evaluation ratio (1) must be considered rather than, for example, simply the
quantity Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M random} alone, or rather than the marginal ratio (2). Additionally, the
distributions of likelihood scores derived here will be applied in Section 5 when we consider model space issues.
We return now to the assumptions of Section 3.1, and consider the computation of likelihood when a single,
known G(q) is associated with each network G, and write model M =<G,G(q)>. The more common situation in
which the associated distribution G(q) is unknown to the evaluation often is approached by specifying a Dirichlet
prior over the space Q of distributions, leading to the Bayesian-Dirichlet (BD) metric. Consequences of this
approach are considered in Section 4.3.
The likelihood evaluation of any model M =< G,G(q) > given data d = {x1,x2,...,xi,...,xN} is given by
P{d | M} =
N
Õ
i
Pr{xi | M}
Because the assumed structure of G (see assumptions in Section 3.1) asserts that some subset PS ⊆U of features
renders the class node conditionally independent of the remaining features, and that all features are independent
of each other and each assumes a binary value with equal probability, we may write
N
Õ
i
Pr{xi | M) =
N
Õ
i
(Pr{C(xi) | ps(xi)}∗(
1
2|U|)),
where ps(xi) is the parent cell of M to which the ith observation of d falls, C(xi) is the class (1 or 2) of this
observation, and Pr{C(xi) | ps(xi)} is the conditional probability assigned by G(q) to this cell’s class probability.
The term 1
2|U| is the probability of the feature value combination observed in xi — since the features take on
combinations of values with equal probability, this is a constant not depending on the particular feature value
combination in xi or on the model M being evaluated. Hence, we omit the term and write simply
L(M,d) =
N
Õ
i
Pr{C(xi) | ps(xi)} (3)
Note that, in the context of such Bayesian networks, this data likelihood is equivalent to conditional class
likelihood [8]. Also, [11] demonstrates that this formulation can be used to evaluate parent set Bayesian network
classiﬁers, even when edges may exist between the features.
Consider a Q space of distributions in which any given model’s distribution q assigns the classes in each of its
cells either pr or (1−pr), for some single 0.5≤ pr ≤1. When this assumption of a binary q (that is, a q assigning
one of two values as each conditional class probability) is relaxed, the distributions become the more complicated
multinomial rather binomial distributions, but no fundamental change in formulation is required.
12Under the assumption of a binary q, the possible likelihood scores that a model M =< G,G(q) > can achieve
are
L(M,d) = P{d | M} = prH ∗ (1− pr)(N−H)
for H = 0,1,...,N. In particular, the score prH ∗ (1−pr)(N−H) is achieved exactly when H of the N observations
xi of d take on the probability-pr class value b of the cell ps(xi) to which xi falls. (That is, the value of the class
b ∈ {1,2} is such that Pr{C = b | ps(xi)} = pr.)
In accordance with our general deﬁnition of coherence, which considers the ratio of the distributions of EV
scores conditioned on true and random models, we consider these distributions for likelihood scores. In the case
of likelihood, note that we are effectively considering the probability of a d such that the probability of d being
generated is equal to some value v, conditioned on the model being true or random. That is, we are considering the
collective probability, conditioned on M being true or random, of the set of d’s with likelihood score L(M,d) = v.
Theorem 3.2: Let M be any model with associated q that is such that q assigns the classes in each of its cells
either pr or (1− pr), for some single 0.5 ≤ pr ≤ 1, in any proportion. Then
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = prH ∗ (1− pr)(N−H) | M true}
= Binomial(N,H,pr)
=
µ
N
H
¶
∗ (prH ∗(1− pr)(N−H))
for H = 0,1,...,N, and the probability of L(M,d) assuming any other score is 0.
Proof: For each observation x ∈ d that M generates, x falls into either a pr cell or a (1− pr) cell of q. The
probability that M generates an x falling into a pr cell of q is pr, regardless of the parent cell to which x falls, i.e.,
if x falls to parent cell ps, and if Pr{C = b | ps} = pr, x will be of class b with probability pr and hence fall into
the pr cell with probability pr. Consequently, the probability of M generating a d such that
Pr{d | M true} = prH ∗ (1− pr)(N−H) is distributed as the binomial distribution Binomial(N,H,pr).
¤
Note that the theorem asserts that, for any binary q,
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | M truth} =
µ
N
H
¶
∗ Pr{d | M truth}
for any d achieving likelihood score v = prH ∗ (1− pr)(N−H).
While Theorem 3.2 holds regardless of the proportion of ps for which q assigns Pr{C = 1 | ps} and Pr{C =
2 | ps} the probability pr, the distribution for random models is considered ﬁrst under the assumption of a sym-
metric q, deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.3: Distribution q is symmetric if pr is assigned as the conditional class probability to Pr{C = 1 | ps}
and Pr{C = 2 | ps} with equal frequency, and hence the unconditional class probabilities are equal, i.e.,
Pr{C = 1} = Pr{C = 2} = 0.5.
Theorem 3.3: Let M be any model with associated q that symmetrically assigns the classes in each of its cells
either pr or (1− pr), for some single 0.5 ≤ pr ≤ 1. Then
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = prH ∗ (1− pr)(N−H) | M random}
13= Binomial(N,H,0.5)
=
µ
N
H
¶
∗ (0.5H ∗(1−0.5)(N−H))
=
µ
N
H
¶
∗ 0.5N
for H = 0,1,...,N, and the probability of L(M,d) assuming any other score is 0.
Proof: For each observation x ∈ d that the true model M∗ (different from M) generates, x falls into either a pr cell
or a (1− pr) cell of the q associated with M. This depends on the parent cell ps of M to which x falls, and the
class of case x. The class b of case x is determined by M∗’s generation of x, but by the disjointness assumption,
M∗ does not affect this ps of M, all of which are equally likely. Since q is symmetric, it is equally likely that the
ps to which x falls assigns pr to class b as it is that it assigns (1− pr) to class b. Consequently, the probability of
M∗ generating a d such that Pr{d | M random} = prH ∗ (1−pr)(N−H) is distributed as the binomial distribution
Binomial(N,H,0.5).
¤
Note that the theorem asserts that, for any binary symmetric q,
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | M random} =
µ
N
H
¶
∗ Pr{d | M random}
for any d achieving likelihood score v = prH ∗ (1− pr)(N−H). See Example 3.1 below for the consequences on
the distribution of scores of random models of relaxing the restriction to a symmetric q.
We noted in the previous section that likelihood is a coherent measure, and that this result does not depend on
any assumptions on q; the examples which follow illustrate different forms that this coherent behavior can take.
The evaluation ratio (1) used to characterize coherence takes a particularly simple form for likelihood when q
is symmetric, and we ﬁnd this form useful in the analysis developed in Section 5. Theorem 3.4 establishes that
when q is symmetric, the distribution of likelihood scores of any model Mi (random or true) does not depend on
knowledge of the scores achieved by any other model, and when Mi is random, the score of Mi also does not
depend on the identity of the true model.
Theorem 3.4: If for each model M, there is a single pr such that q symmetrically assigns the classes in M’s parent
cell either pr or (1− pr), for some single 0.5 ≤ pr ≤ 1, then
(A) For M different from the true model M∗ and score v = prH ∗(1− pr)(N−H):
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | M∗ truth, L(Mi,d) for all models Mi other than M}
= Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | NOT M}
= Binomial(N,H,0.5)
(B) For the true model M∗ and score v = prH ∗(1− pr)(N−H):
Pr{d such that L(M∗,d) = v | M∗ truth, L(Mi,d) for all models Mi other than M∗}
= Pr{d such that L(M∗,d) = v | M∗ truth}
= Binomial(N,H,pr)
Proof:
(A) The event [NOT M] is equivalent to [M random]. Random M achieves score v = prH ∗(1− pr)(N−H) exactly
14when H of the N cases of data d fall to the pr classes of the ps cells of M to which they fall. Without knowledge
of to which ps cell of M a case x falls, even with knowledge of the class C(x) of x, the probability of x falling to
the pr class of its ps(x) is 0.5, since q is symmetric and all ps cells are equally likely, independent of knowledge
of the values of all remaining features (other than those in M’s parent set). Since the conditioning event
[M∗ truth, L(Mi,d) for all models Mi other than M]
does not change the distribution of ps cells of M from equally likely (since parent sets are disjoint and their
features are statistically independent), the probability remains Binomial(N,H,0.5).
(B) M∗ achieves score = prH ∗(1−pr)(N−H) exactly when H of the N cases of data d fall to the pr class of the ps
cells of M∗ to which they fall. The score of any random model on d is statistically independent of the distribution
of the classes in d since every q is symmetric, and does not affect the ps distribution of M∗, since parent sets are
disjoint and their features statistically independent. Since the conditioning event
[L(Mi,d) for all models Mi other than M∗]
does not change the distribution2 of the classes in d or of the ps cells of M∗ from all equally likely, the probability
remains Binomial(N,H,pr).
¤
As will be seen for apparent error rate in Sections 4.1, and for the BD metric in Section 4.3, Theorem 3.4 does
not hold for all measures. Further, even for likelihood, the result of Theorem 3.4 requires that q be symmetric.
That is, as the following example demonstrates, when q is not symmetric, for M 6= M∗ we may fail to have either
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | M∗ truth, L(M∗,d) = v0} = Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | M∗ truth}
or
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | M∗ truth} = Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | NOT M}
when q is not symmetric. The lack of independence occurs because, without a symmetric q, knowledge of the
true model, or of its likelihood score, can affect the distribution of a random model’s likelihood score, by leaking
information of the relative class frequencies in d. In such a case, the behavior of the simple marginal evaluation
ratio (2) can be misleading to an analysis of a measure’s coherence. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.1: Let M1,...,Mq be members of card2 (that is, each has a parent set of size 2), such that for each
of these Mi, Pr{C = 1|ps1} = Pr{C = 1|ps2} = Pr{C = 1|ps3} = 1 and Pr{C = 2|ps4} = 1. Let the remaining
model with nonzero prior probability M0 be in card2 as well, and suppose M0 reverses the proportion of class
probabilities: Pr{C = 2|ps1} = Pr{C = 2|ps2} = Pr{C = 2|ps3} = 1 and Pr{C = 1|ps4} = 1. All q+1 models
respect the disjoint feature assumption. Note that for any of these q+1 models M,
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = 1 | M truth} = 1.0,
since each parent state of each model functionally determines the class label. Intuitively, each of the Mi models
has a greater chance of scoring L(Mi,d) = 1 when it is random than does M0 when it is random, because when
2Observe that the result would continue to hold even if we conditioned on full knowledge of every data value in the cases of d, including
the class label but excluding the values of M∗’s parent set features; similarly, the result would continue to hold if we conditioned on the values
of M∗’s parent features, but excluded each case’s class label.
15Mi is random, it is still extremely likely (assuming large enough q) that another Mj with the same allocation of
conditional class probabilities generates the data. On the other hand, when M0 is random, it is far less likely
that it scores L(M0,d) = 1, because when M0 is random, some Mj with a reverse allocation of class conditional
probabilities generates the data. This discrepancy at ﬁrst may seem to suggest that likelihood is not coherent: two
models M0 and Mi attaining the same likelihood score don’t appear to imply the same posterior. But this example
illustrates only the danger of ignoring the inter-dependence of model scores by considering the behavior of the
simple marginal ratio (2), or, similarly, the marginal posterior Pr{M|L(M,d) = v}.
To make the example concrete, consider data d consisting of a single observation. As observed above,
Pr{d such that L(Mi,d) = 1 | Mi truth} = 1.0
Pr{d such that L(M0,d) = 1 | M0 truth} = 1.0
since parent states functionally determine the class. Additionally, we compute:
Pr{d such that L(M0,d) = 1 | NOT M0}
= Pr{d such that L(M0,d) = 1 | Mj truth, for some 1 ≤ j ≤ q}
= Pr{x1 falls to one of the C = 1 Mj cells}∗Pr{x1 falls to the sinlgeC = 1 M0 cell}
+Pr{x1 falls to the single C = 2 Mj cell}∗Pr{x1 falls to one of the C = 2 M0 cells}
= (3/4)∗(1/4) + (1/4)∗(3/4) = 6/16
Pr{d such that L(Mi,d) = 1 | NOT Mi}
≈ Pr{d such that L(Mi,d) = 1 | Mj truth, for some 1 ≤ j ≤ q,i 6= j}
= Pr{x1 falls to one of the C = 1 Mj cells}∗Pr{x1 falls to one of the C = 1 Mi cells}
+Pr{x1 falls to the single C = 2 Mj cell}∗Pr{x1 falls to the single C = 2 Mi cell}
= (3/4)∗(3/4) + (1/4)∗(1/4) = 10/16
(The approximation is valid for large q, in which case the event that [M0 is truth], conditioned on [NOT Mi], has
a negligible contribution.)
Consequently,
Pr{d such that L(Mi,d) = 1 | Mi truth}
Pr{d such that L(Mi,d) = 1 | NOT Mi}
≈
16
10
while
Pr{d such that L(M0,d) = 1 | M0 truth}
Pr{d such that L(M0,d) = 1 | NOT M0}
=
16
6
This implies, when model priors are equal,
Pr{Mi | L(Mi,d) = 1} < Pr{M0|L(M0,d) = 1}
and there is a temptation to conclude that likelihood is not coherent!
However, the pertinent issue to consider is, what can we conclude if, on a particular d, we observe that both Mi
and M0 achieve the same likelihood score of 1? That is, what can we conclude about the posteriors
Pr{Mi truth | L(Mi,d) = 1 and L(M0,d) = 1} vs. Pr{M0 truth | L(Mi,d) = 1 and L(M0,d) = 1}?
This leads us to the evaluation ratios (1) used in the deﬁnition of coherence, whose denominators in the current
example are
Pr{d such that L(Mi,d) = 1 | M0 truth, L(M0,d) = 1} and
Pr{d such that L(M0,d) = 1 | Mi truth, L(Mi,d) = 1}.
16Pr{d such that L(M0,d) = 1 | Mi truth, L(Mi,d) = 1} is the same as Pr{d such that L(M0,d) = 1 | NOT M0}
and, as computed above, equals 6
16. But now the other denominator,
Pr{d such that L(Mi,d) = 1 | M0 truth, L(M0,d) = 1},
clearly has this same value, i.e.,
Pr{d such that L(Mi,d) = 1 | M0 truth, L(M0,d) = 1}
= Pr{x1 falls to one of the C = 2 M0 cells}∗Pr{x1 falls to the single C = 2 Mi cell}
+Pr{x1 falls to the single C = 1 M0 cell}∗Pr{x1 falls to one of the C = 1 Mi cell}
= (3/4)∗(1/4) + (1/4)∗(3/4) = 6/16
Consequently, the evaluation ratios are the same and hence
Pr{Mi truth | L(Mi,d) = 1 and L(M0,d) = 1} = Pr{M0 truth | L(Mi,d) = 1 and L(M0,d) = 1}
¤
Examples 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate two types of scoring behavior for symmetric q. In this case, when comparing
the score ratios for M and M0, applying Theorem 3.4 we simplify the denominator
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | M0 truth, L(M0,d) = v0}
to the equivalent
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = v | NOT M}.
Example 3.2: If Mk ∈ cardk and Mk0 ∈ cardk0 are homomorphic (see Deﬁnition 3.2), each assigning to
Pr{C = 1 | ps} either pr or (1−pr) symmetrically, then each of the numerator and denominator of the coherence
ratio is equal between Mk and Mk0 for every value v, that is,
Pr{d such that L(Mk,d) = v | Mk truth} = Pr{d such that L(Mk0,d) = v | Mk0 truth}
and
Pr{d such that L(Mk,d) = v | Mk random} = Pr{d such that L(Mk0,d) = v | Mk0 random}
This follows directly from the distributions speciﬁed by Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 above. From Theorem 3.4, we thus
have also
Pr{d such that L(Mk,d) = v | Mk0 truth, L(Mk0,d) = v}
= Pr{d such that L(Mk0,d) = v | Mk truth, L(Mk,d) = v}
yielding a particularly simple form of coherent behavior.
¤
Example 3.3: When the conditional probabilities assigned to class labels differ across models (and hence models
are not homomorphic), a more complex interaction than in Example 3.2 is seen, even when the individual q remain
symmetric. Suppose q1 = M1(q) assigns probabilities pr1 = 0.99 and (1− pr1) = 0.01 to the classes conditioned
on parent states ps, while q2 =M2(q) assigns probabilities pr2 =0.6 and (1−pr2)=0.4, with every q symmetric.
We compute distributions for likelihood score v1 achieved by M1 and scores v2a and v2b achieved by M2, speciﬁed
as:
v1 = ln(0.9989 ∗ 0.0111) = −51.551352 (i.e.,H1 = 89)
v2a = ln(0.6098 ∗ 0.402) = −51.893493 (i.e.,H2a = 98)
v2b = ln(0.6099 ∗ 0.401) = −51.488027 (i.e.,H2b = 99)
17The computations are performed with respect to data d of size 100 observations, and log likelihoods (denoted
LL(M,d) below) and logs of probabilities are used to avoid numerical underﬂow.
Note that the scores v1, v2a, and v2b are nearly identical, with v2a < v1 < v2b. (The combinatorics do not yield a
score appropriate for this illustration that is achievable exactly by both the models.) The following quantities are
computed analytically:
ln(Pr{d such that LL(M1,d) = v1|M1 true}) = −18.967114
ln(Pr{d such that LL(M1,d) = v1|M1 random}) = −36.730480
ln(R(M1,v1)) = ln(
Pr{d such that LL(M1,d) = v1|M1 true}
Pr{d such that LL(M1,d) = v1|M1 random}
) = 17.76336
ln(Pr{d such that LL(M2,d) = v2a|M2 true}) = −43.386350
ln(Pr{d such that LL(M2,d) = v2a|M2 random}) = −60.807575
ln(R(M2,v2a)) = ln(
Pr{d such that LL(M2,d) = v2a|M2 true}
Pr{d such that LL(M2,d) = v2a|M2 random}
) = 17.42125
ln(Pr{d such that LL(M2,d) = v2b|M2 true}) = −46.882857
ln(Pr{d such that LL(M2,d) = v2b|M2 random}) = −64.709548
ln(R(M2,v2b)) = ln(
Pr{d such that LL(M2,d) = v2b|M2 true}
Pr{d such that LL(M2,d) = v2b|M2 random}
) = 17.826691
Observe how it is far more common for the model M1 with conditional class probabilities pr1 = 0.99 to achieve
the score v1 than it is for the model M2 with conditional class probabilities pr2 = 0.60 to achieve either of the
nearly identical scores v2a or v2b. However, this tendency applies to the models both when random and true, and,
consequently, the ratios (and hence the posteriors) are also nearly identical, and are ordered consistently with the
scores, that is
R(M2,v2a) < R(M1,v1) < R(M2,v2b)
To understand why the ratio (and hence the posteriors) will always be ordered as v and v0 are ordered, observe that
the binomial coefﬁcient in the numerator and denominator of the ratio above for each vj (j =1,2a,2b) is identical,
i,e,
µ
N
Hj
¶
, and hence Binomial(N,Hj,prj)/Binomial(N,Hj,0.5) reduces to the likelihood of the data given Mj
divided by 0.5Hj ∗0.5(N−H j) = (0.5)N. The fact that the ratios are ordered as the scores follows from the fact
that, after this cancellation of the
µ
N
Hj
¶
terms, the denominators are a common 0.5N, and thus the order of the
likelihood scores determines the order of the ratios. Even in cases when q is not symmetric and the joint version
does not reduce to the marginal ratio, the ratio for likelihood is coherent, though the analysis is considerably more
complicated since it cannot be done in terms of the simpler marginal ratio.
¤
An important implication of Example 3.3 is that the behavior of the quantity
Pr{d such that EV(M,d) = v | M random}
alone reveals little regarding model posteriors. That is, analyzing how likely it is for a random model with certain
characteristics (e.g., peaked probabilities or high complexities) to achieve a good observed score by chance alone
18(e.g., an observed score p-value) is of little relevance to the questions of model evaluation and model selection
considered here.
4. Some Important Non-coherent Measures
4.1 Apparent Training Error
Apparent training error is one of the simplest, most intuitive, and widely used measures in application and
theoretical analysis. This evaluation measure is most often applied to classiﬁcation trees without reference to an
associated distribution q as, for example, in [3, 17, 20, 23, 30]. As was described in Section 3.1, our probability
models can be viewed from the perspective of homogeneous classiﬁcation trees, with the parent cells of M cor-
responding to the leaves of the tree. Equivalently, from the Bayesian network perspective, though M consists of
a network structure G and a distribution q, the analogous application of apparent training error does not depend
on q. In both modelings, the apparent error rate is a simple function of the model structure and the frequentist
distribution this structure derives from the data d.
Deﬁnition 4.1: Let M be a model with parent cell ps, and suppose that for data d there are n and m members of
each class falling to this cell. The smaller number min(n,m) i.e., the minority count, is the apparent error for this
ps (error is n, if n = m). The apparent error rate ER(M,d) for the model M on data d is the sum over all of M’s
psi of these apparent errors.
In Section 4.2, apparent error rate is deﬁned in the context of cross validation.
It is easy to see that ER is not a coherent measure, and fails on even the minimal requirement of complexity
coherence, where the models evaluated differ only in their complexities. Consider, for example, a perfect score
of ER = 0. As the number of parents k becomes arbitrarily large, and the size of data d is held ﬁxed, the proba-
bility of more than one case xi from d falling into the same parent cell approaches zero, regardless of whether the
parents are correlated with the class or not, and regardless of the relative class counts in d. Since parent cells with
fewer than two cases cannot incur observed errors, the total number of observed errors is zero with probability ap-
proaching 1.0, for both random and true models of high complexity, and thus the evaluation ratio (1) for achieving
ER = 0 goes to 1 as k increases. However, when k is small, for any true model in which some conditional class
probability pr > 0.5, the ratio for achieving ER = 0 is bounded away from 1 from above.
The result is most easily established with symmetric q assigning a single pr as conditional class probabilities.
Theorem 4.1: Let M1 ∈ card1 and Mk ∈ cardk, with all q symmetric and assigning a single 0.5 < pr ≤ 1.0. Then
Pr{d such that ER(M1,d) = 0 | M1 truth}
Pr{d such that ER(M1,d) = 0 | Mk truth and ER(Mk,d) = 0}
> (1+g)
for some g > 0, depending only on pr and |d|, and not k, while, as k increases,
Pr{d such that ER(Mk,d) = 0 | Mk truth}
Pr{d such that ER(Mk,d) = 0 | M1 truth and ER(M1,d) = 0}
becomes arbitrarily close to 1.0, for any ﬁxed pr and |d|.
Proof: So long as pr > 0.5,
Pr{d such that ER(M1,d) = 0 | M1 truth}
Pr{d such that ER(M1,d) = 0 | NOT M1}
19isclearlygreaterthan1.0, andincreasesassizeofd or pr increases. Thedependenceon[Mk truthand ER(Mk,d)=
0] of the denominator
Pr{d such that ER(M1,d) = 0 | Mk truth and ER(Mk,d)} = 0
of the evaluation ratio is diminished as k increases, since for k arbitrarily large and size of d ﬁxed, ER(Mk,d) = 0
with probability approaching 1 and hence no information is gained from the event [ER(Mk,d)= 0]. Further, since
all q are symmetric, no information is obtained from the event [Mk truth]. Hence, for sufﬁciently large k,
Pr{d such that ER(M1,d) = 0 | Mk truth and ER(Mk,d) = 0}
behaves as
Pr{d such that ER(M1,d) = 0 | NOT M1}
Each of the numerator and denominator of
Pr{d such that ER(Mk,d) = 0 | Mk truth}
Pr{d such that ER(Mk,d) = 0 | M1 truth and ER(M1,d) = 0}
is made arbitrarily close to 1.0 by increasing k so that none of the 2k parent cells have more than a single data point
with nonvanishing probability. (And note, as a concrete example of the nonequality of ratios if pr =1 and |d|=2,
the M1 ratio evaluates to approximately 1.0/(0.75) = 1.33, while the second approaches 1.0 as k is increased.)
¤
Theorem 4.1 establishes that ER is not even complexity coherent, since the models considered are homomor-
phic. Consequently, when a complex and simple model score the same low score (e.g., 0 errors) on some data,
the simpler model has a higher true posterior, assuming nothing beyond equal model priors. Critically, in contrast
to the very correct objections such as those in [23, 30] against the existence of absolute complexity biases, the
complexity bias for the non-coherent ER is distribution free – it is present provided only that q has some pr dif-
ferent from 0.5 (and that nonuniform model priors don’t push the posteriors in the opposite direction). The result,
in particular, does not depend on a prior over model space favoring the selection for the true model M∗ of simple
models over complex models.
Example 4.1: Even when k is relatively small, the complexity bias can be quite pronounced. The results below
show the behavior of the ratio for k=1 and k0 =5 and the lowest error rates of 0-4. The q are symmetric, assigning
Pr{C = 1|ps} = 0.8 and Pr{C = 2|ps} = 0.8 equally often. The probabilities are estimated from a generation of
100 million di, each of size 10 observations. Repeated runs show the results to be stable.
Pr{ER(M1,d) = 0 | M1 truth} / Pr{ER(M1,d) = 0 | M5 truth and ER(M5,d) = 0} ≈ 22.082228
Pr{ER(M5,d) = 0 | M5 truth} / Pr{ER(M5,d) = 0 | M1 truth and ER(M1,d) = 0} ≈ 1.296588
Pr{ER(M1,d) = 1 | M1 truth} / Pr{ER(M1,d) = 1 | M5 truth and ER(M5,d) = 1} ≈ 9.461787
Pr{ER(M5,d) = 1 | M5 truth} / Pr{ER(M5,d) = 1 | M1 truth and ER(M1,d) = 1} ≈ 0.770556
Pr{ER(M1,d) = 2 | M1 truth} / Pr{ER(M1,d) = 2 | M5 truth and ER(M5,d) = 2} ≈ 2.682664
Pr{ER(M5,d) = 2 | M5 truth} / Pr{ER(M5,d) = 2 | M1 truth and ER(M1,d) = 2} ≈ 0.460982
Pr{ER(M1,d) = 3 | M1 truth} / Pr{ER(M1,d) = 3 | M5 truth and ER(M5,d) = 3} ≈ 0.647048
Pr{ER(M5,d) = 3 | M5 truth} / Pr{ER(M5,d) = 3 | M1 truth and ER(M1,d) = 3} ≈ 0.257815
Pr{ER(M1,d) = 4 | M1 truth} / Pr{ER(M1,d) = 4 | M5 truth and ER(M5,d) = 4} ≈ 0.133671
Pr{ER(M5,d) = 4 | M5 truth} / Pr{ER(M5,d) = 4 | M1 truth and ER(M1,d) = 4} ≈ 0.118234
Note, for example, on data d of size 10 for which M1 and M5 simultaneously incur 0 errors, the above results,
combined with Corollary 3.1, allow us to conclude that M1 is more probable than is M5 by a factor of greater
than 16, assuming equal model priors. Further, we see from the following that on data d of size 10 for which M1
incurs 1 error and M5 simultaneously incurs 0 errors, M1 is more probable than is M5 by a factor of greater than
4, assuming equal model priors. The model parameters are the same as above, and 100 million generations of di
again are used to estimate the probabilities.
20Pr{ER(M1,d) = 1 | M1 truth} / Pr{ER(M1,d) = 1 | M5 truth and ER(M5,d) = 0} ≈ 6.347174
Pr{ER(M5,d) = 0 | M5 truth} / Pr{ER(M5,d) = 0 | M1 truth and ER(M1,d) = 1} ≈ 1.291417
¤
4.2 Cross Validation and the Apparent Error Rate Measure
It is well known that the apparent error rate of the best ﬁtting of many models under-estimates the true out-of-
sample error rate of this model. If many random models exist, at least some will ﬁt the training data well, possibly
with zero errors, if there are enough models relative to the size of the training data. The results of the previous
section imply that individual complex models are more prone to this problem, since when they have low apparent
error rates they are individually less likely than simple models with the same error rate to be the true model.
Leave one out cross validation (LOOCV) is a technique that yields low bias estimates of expected out-of-
sample classiﬁcation error, though with high variance. Consequently, we examined whether using the LOOCV
error rate yields a complexity coherent measure in the context of the model selection problem under study. Our
results indicate that this is not the case. Speciﬁcally, we consider a scenario in which a collection of potential
models M are evaluated using cross validation error XER, deﬁned below, and again conclude that when individual
complex models score well on this measure they are individually less likely than simple models with the same
score to be the true model. Note that in this model evaluation scenario, the structural speciﬁcation (i.e., the identity
of a model’s parent set features, which, by deﬁnition, are binary and not to be binned) of each model M so evalu-
ated is ﬁxed in advance and is independent of the cross validation procedure. In particular, the only characteristic
of the model M that is fold dependent is the parent cell class counts, which determine the classiﬁcation of each
held-out case.
The LOOCV error is the number of held-out cases that are evaluated incorrectly when the majority class rule
with respect each fold’s in-sample cases is used to evaluate the held-out case. Since LOOCV is deterministic in
the sense that every case is a hold-out case exactly once, the LOOCV error of any model is determined by the
model’s parent set conditioning of the entire training set into ps cells. That is, we can determine exactly what
the LOOCV error of a model M will be by examining the statistical breakdown on the entire training set of that
model’s parent cells ps. This leads to the following deﬁnition of LOOCV apparent error rate, which agrees with
the number of errors incurred by M using the standard LOOCV procedure.
Deﬁnition4.2: SupposeamodelM inducesontheentiretrainingsetd a psi cellclassbreakdownof(nClass1,mClass2).
Then the LOOCV error contributed by this cell psi on data d can be computed as:
a) If n+1 < m, then n. Every one of these n held out Class 1 cases is in the minority for its fold, and hence
each incurs an error. Every one of these held out Class 2 cases is in the majority of its fold and is classiﬁed
correctly.
b) If n > m+1, then m. Symmetric argument to case (a)
c) If n = m, then (n+m). Every held out case is in the minority of its fold.
d) If n+1 = m, then n + m
2 . Every one of the n held out Class 1 cases is in the minority for its fold, and
hence each incurs an error. Every one of the held out Class 2 cases evaluates as a tie in its fold and hence
incurs half an error.
e) If n = m+1, then n
2 + m. Symmetric argument to case (d).
The total LOOCV error XER(M,d) of model M incurred on data d is the sum of the LOOCV errors contributed
by M’s psi on d.
Note that in cases (a) and (b) XER gives the same error contribution as ER, while in case (c), (d), and (e) the
contribution of XER is higher.
21The results below for homomorphic models M1 and M2 of size 1 and 2 parent sets demonstrate that the
evaluation ratio for the lowest achievable LOOVC error scores (0 and 1
2) each is larger for the simpler model
M1 than for the more complex model M2, demonstrating that LOOCV error rate is not a complexity coherent
evaluation. This means that, when the simple model and the complex model score 0 LOOCV errors on the same
data, and when each model scores 1
2 error on the same data, the simpler is more likely to be truth, in each of these
cases. That is, the model posteriors behave as
Pr{M1 truth | d such that XER(M1,d) = 0 and XER(M2,d) = 0 }
> Pr{M2 truth | d such that XER(M1,d) = 0 and XER(M2,d) = 0 }
and
Pr{M1 truth | d such that XER(M1,d) =
1
2
and XER(M2,d) =
1
2
}
> Pr{M2 truth | d such that XER(M1,d) =
1
2
and XER(M2,d) =
1
2
}
Example 4.2: Let M1 ∈ card1 and M2 ∈ card2, and the q be symmetric, assigning Pr{C = 1|ps} = 0.8 and
Pr{C = 2|ps} = 0.8 equally often. The following probabilities are estimated from a generation of 1 billion di,
each of size 10 observations.3 Repeated runs show the results to be stable.
Pr{XER(M1,d) = 0 | M1 truth} / Pr{XER(M1,d) = 0 | M2 truth and XER(M2,d) = 0} ≈ 6.569512
Pr{XER(M2,d) = 0 | M2 truth} / Pr{XER(M2,d) = 0 | M1 truth and XER(M1,d) = 0} ≈ 5.110326
Pr{XER(M1,d) = 1
2 | M1 truth} / Pr{XER(M1,d) = 1
2 | M2 truth and XER(M2,d) = 1
2} ≈ 7.629853
Pr{XER(M2,d) = 1
2 | M2 truth} / Pr{XER(M2,d) = 1
2 | M1 truth and XER(M1,d) = 1
2} ≈ 0.516692
We compared also ratios on data d of size 10 for which M1 incurs 1
2 error and M2 simultaneously incurs 0 errors.
As is seen below, assuming equal model priors, M1 is more probable than is M2 by a factor of greater than 16,
despite M2 being conditioned on the better XER score of no LOOVC errors, i.e,
Pr{M1 truth | d such that XER(M1,d) =
1
2
and XER(M2,d) = 0 }
> Pr{M2 truth | d such that XER(M1,d) =
1
2
and XER(M2,d) = 0 }
In the following, the same model parameters as above are used, and again 1 billion generations of data di of 10
observations each is used to estimate the probabilities.
Pr{XER(M1,d) = 1
2 | M1 truth} / Pr{XER(M1,d) = 1
2 | M2 truth and XER(M2,d) = 0} ≈ 9.418634
Pr{XER(M2,d) = 0 | M2 truth} / Pr{XER(M2,d) = 0 | M1 truth and XER(M1,d) = 1
2} ≈ 0.606764
3Note how the interaction of model scores results in the ratio
Pr{XER(M2,d) = 1
2 | M2 truth} / Pr{XER(M2,d) = 1
2 | M1 truth and XER(M1,d) = 1
2}
being less than 1.0. On data d for which M1 scores 1
2 error, it is relatively likely that the class counts are skewed, for example, M1’s parent
cells yield a class-split pattern such as ps1 = (2 Class1, 1 Class2), ps2 = (7 Class1, 0 Class2), which in turn implies that on such d random
M2 incurs 1
2 error with relatively high probability.
224.3 The BD Metric
In Section 3.2, we considered model posterior and likelihood as evaluation measures under a scenario in which
each nonzero P(M) model’s network structure G had associated with it a single, known distribution G(q). Recall
how the computation of the likelihood of model M =< G,G(q) > depends on knowledge of this G(q):
L(M,d) =
N
Õ
i
Pr{xi | M) =
N
Õ
i
(Pr{C(xi) | ps(xi)}),
where the conditional class probabilities Pr{C(xi) | ps(xi)} are assigned by G(q). (As in (3), we continue to omit
from the likelihood expression the constant term 1
2|U|.)
The device of assuming that the associated G(q) is ﬁxed and known to the evaluation function, while allowing
for a simple demonstration of how likelihood and model posterior can be computed and how they behave as model
evaluators, does not reﬂect typical situations of interest. Typically, one does not know with any certainty what dis-
tribution q might be associated with each network structure G, and quantiﬁes this uncertainty by specifying to the
evaluation function a prior distribution g(q|G) (a distribution over distributions, or a so-called hyper-distribution)
over the space Q of possible q. Under this modeling, each network structure G represents a generally inﬁnite
family of models < G,{q} >. The prior distribution g(q|G) then combines with the data d to yield the posterior
of a model structure G (without reference to a speciﬁc q), obtained by integrating over the space Q of the possible
distributions q. Since we continue to assume uniform priors P(G) over model structures, it sufﬁces to consider
data likelihood
Pr{d | G,g} =
Z
Pr{d | q}×g(q | G)dq
of model structure G, which is proportional to the posterior of the model structure. Notice that such a likelihood
is the probability of data d, given the network structure G and prior g(q|G), that is, this is the probability of data
given a family < G,{q} > of models and the distribution g(q|G), rather than of a particular M =< G,G(q) >.
Operationally, the likelihood evaluation of d given G is under the premise that if G is truth, a q is associated with
G according to the distribution g(q|G), and it is this G(q) that generates the observed d.
In this section, we consider the question, if models G are evaluated by such scoring functions, for what q that
might in actuality be associated with G, is the evaluation coherent, in particular, complexity coherent? Notation-
ally, since the model evaluations are applied to a network structure G which represents a family < G,{q} > of
models, rather than to a single model M =< G,q >, G will be the argument to the evaluation measures, and we
will speak of the complexity k of a model structure Gk, still deﬁned in terms the number of parents of the class
node.
In much of the Bayesian learning literature, the prior g(q|G) takes the form of a Dirichlet distribution, which
is a conjugate family of distributions for multinomial sampling, the latter being the distribution that governs the
observed data. Heckerman [10] demonstrates also that a Dirichlet prior distribution is implied by a set of common
assumptions (which includes parameter independence and likelihood equivalence). That the Dirichlet distribution
is a conjugate family of distributions for multinomial sampling makes tractable the computation of data likelihood
(and hence model structure posterior) whenever the prior g(q|G) is Dirichlet. The resulting data likelihood is what
is known as the BD (Bayesian-Dirichlet) metric4:
Pr{d | G, g}
=
Z
Pr{d | q}×g(q | G)dq
4Technically, the BD metric is more commonly deﬁned in terms of the joint probability Pr{d, G}, which is simply the above expression
multiplied by the network prior P(G),
23= Õ
n Õ
p
G(ap)
G(ap+Np)Õ
v
G(apv+Npv)
G(apv)
, (4)
where
G is the Gamma function;
n ranges over the nodes in G;
p ranges over values < p > of the parent set of the node n ﬁxed by the outermost Õ;
v ranges over the values of the node n ﬁxed by the outermost Õ;
Np is the number of observations in d falling to parent cell < p > and Npv is the number of observations in
d falling to parent cell < p > and having node n value v; and
ap and apv are parameters of the Dirichlet prior distribution as is described in the following subsection.
Since we continue to assume that the networks we shall evaluate contain edges only from the members of the
parent set to the class node, the BD value computed at each (non-class) feature node is the same for a ﬁxed d,
regardless of the particular structure G being evaluated. Hence, as we did for ordinary likelihood in Section 3.2,
in the following we restrict the BD score (which is node-wise decomposable) of a network G to the score on the
class node. That is, in the outer product of (4) we hold n ﬁxed at the class node and obtain
BD(G,d)
= Õ
p
G(ap)
G(ap+Np)Õ
v
G(apv+Npv)
G(apv)
. (5)
In fact, even when edges may exist between the features, [11] demonstrates that the classiﬁcation power of a
parent set network can be evaluated by restricting BD to the class node, obtaining, in the context of the parent set
model, equivalence with conditional class likelihood [8].
As is standard, we write BD(G,d) without explicit reference to the parameters ap and apv of the Dirichlet
prior g(q|G). In the following, when we write the event [G, g truth], we mean model structure G and Dirichlet
prior g(q|G) (with understood parameters ap and apv) govern the generation of the data d. This expression (5)
therefore is the likelihood of data d assuming a model structure G and its speciﬁc Dirichlet prior g(q|G). Since
BD is a likelihood, it is a coherent measure, as was indicated for likelihood in Section 3.2. In particular, when
truth is a family consisting of a network structure G and an associated distribution g(q|G) over Q, coherence of
the BD measure means that for all data d, model structure pairs G and G0, and scores v < v0,
Pr{d such that BD(G,d) = v | G, g truth}
Pr{d such that BD(G,d) = v | G0, g truth and BD(G0,d) = v0}
<
Pr{d such that BD(G0,d) = v0 | G0, g truth}
Pr{d such that BD(G0,d) = v0 | G, g truth and BD(G,d) = v}
Assuming equal model structure priors P(G), the equivalent consequence in terms of model posteriors is
Pr{G truth, g truth | d such that BD(G,d) = v and BD(G0,d) = v0}
< Pr{G0 truth, g truth | d such that BD(G,d) = v and BD(G0,d) = v0}
for all data d, model structure pairs G and G0, and scores v < v0.
24In fact, the special properties of likelihood imply that this relationship holds for any single ﬁxed d, not just for
aggregations of d achieving the given BD scores. That is
Pr{G truth, g truth | d }
< Pr{G0 truth, g truth | d }
for any d such that BD(G,d) < BD(G0,d)
As was noted in the observation following Fact 3.1 in Section 3.2, these relationships are established from
speciﬁc properties of likelihood, and do not depend on our assumptions, such as disjointness of model features.
Indeed, in cases where the Dirichlet prior correctly captures how distributions q are associated with true model
structure G, the disjointness assumption on model features fails to hold, since in such cases the same model
structure (deﬁned over a single set of features) has a nonzero prior in association with an inﬁnite number of q.
Of central importance to the current analysis is the observation that the above evaluation ratio and posterior
coherence translate into a lack of model evaluation bias in BD only if the Dirichlet prior g(q|G) actually does
reﬂect how d is generated when G is the true model structure. At best, a Dirichlet prior typically is employed as a
surrogate, a device that allows reasonable prior assumptions to be captured while providing a closed form for the
measure. A pertinent question to ask is, under what conditions, if any, is BD non-coherent when, in actuality, some
speciﬁc (though unknown to the BD evaluation) q is deterministically associated with each G? We are particularly
interested in this behavior with respect to a complexity bias: for what homomorphic qk and qk0 associated with
model structures Gk ∈ cardk and Gk0 ∈ cardk0 does the BD score exhibit a complexity non-coherence? That is,
when, if ever, do we have misordered evaluation ratios
Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) = v | Gk, qk truth}
Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) = v | Gk0, qk0 truth and BD(Gk0,d) = v0}
<
Pr{d such that BD(Gk0,d) = v0 | Gk0, qk0 truth}
Pr{d such that BD(Gk0,d) = v0 | Gk, qk truth and BD(Gk,d) = v}
and hence misordered posteriors
Pr{Gk, qk truth | d such that BD(Gk,d) = v and BD(Gk0,d) = v0}
< Pr{Gk0, qk truth | d such that BD(Gk,d) = v and BD(Gk0,d) = v0}
for homomorphic qk and qk0 and v ≤ v0? Note well that in this formulation, BD is evaluated with respect to a
Dirichlet prior, while G actually is always associated with some single G(q) when G is truth.
4.3.1 Properties of the Dirichlet Distribution
TheDirichletisafamilyofdistributionsparameterizedbythevaluesap andapv (where pand pvareasdeﬁned
following (4) of the previous section), and we must identify which members our analysis will consider. The liter-
ature contains extensive study of attempts to specify noninformative and/or uniform priors, a goal that is known
to be fraught with pitfalls [12, 27]. Often, one attempts to model an uninformative prior by specifying a Dirichlet
with a uniform allocation of vanishing equivalent sample size a. In particular, Buntine [4] proposed modeling an
noninformative Dirichlet prior by specifying apv =
a
(number of parent cells)∗(number of node values)
, with
ap = åvapv. Under our assumption of binary-valued nodes, this translates for Gk ∈ cardk to apv = a
2k+1 and
ap = a
2k. Heckerman et. al. [10] notes that this is an instance of the BDe metric which he terms BDue, for uniform
joint distribution and likelihood equivalent. By specifying a vanishing equivalent sample size a, one attempts to
25realize an uninformative (as well as uniform) prior, though as we shall see, unintended consequences for model
evaluation arise.
Several interesting behaviors of the Dirichlet prior were observed previously by Steck [26], but in some-
what different contexts leading to different interpretations than here. An analysis reveals that the Dirichlet with
vanishing a places virtually all density on q which assign conditional class probabilities Pr{C = 1 | ps} and
Pr{C = 1 | ps} near the extreme values of 0.0 and 1.0, while such a Dirichlet achieves it minima at the q which
assigns conditional class probabilities at the expectations E(Pr{C = 1 | ps}) = 0.5, assuming apv is uniform as
in BDue. Consequently, models that ﬁt the data with only class-pure cells have posterior density which dwarf
that of any other model, since class-pure cells would be generated by the q that are overwhelming most likely to
be drawn from such a Dirichlet. Thus, by making a vanishingly small, one does not diminish the impact of the
Dirichlet prior on the evaluation, but rather ampliﬁes it.
Such a Dirichlet prior has the effect of favoring models, random or true, with class-pure cells, and, as a
vanishes, provided that there are many features available relative to the size of d, this effect dominates model
selection. As with apparent training error, a single complex model, random or true, has more of a chance of
achieving class-pure cells than does a single simple model, random or true. However, there is a competing second
order effect under Dirichlet, and this is that the number y of parent cells populated inﬂuences the score as well. If
two models both have only class pure cells, the model with the fewer number of populated parent cells will score
higher. Here, simple models, random or true, have the advantage among models with class-pure cells, being more
likely to populate few cells, because there are fewer cells to populate.
We now derive the possible BD scores (which, recall, is deﬁned by (5) and is restricted to the class node) a
model can attain, regardless of being random or true, and regardless of the G(q) associated with model structure
G.
Lemma 4.1: Let BD be computed under uniform apv with vanishing a and let d be any data with N observations.
Then for any Gk ∈ cardk, the achievable BD scores BD(Gk,d) approach 0 and 1
2y, y an integer in the range
1 ≤ y ≤ min(2k,N), as a goes to 0. Further, the score 1
2y is approached only when exactly y of Gk’s 2k parent cells
are nonempty in d, and each of these y nonempty parent cells has instances from only one of the classes.
Proof: The effect of Dirichlet with uniform apv with vanishing a is that for each ps, in any q with non-vanishing
density, the probability of Pr{C = 1|ps} approaches either 0 or 1, with equal probability. Consequently, for a d
in which any of the parent cells is not class pure, the BD score approaches 0, since the likelihood of G generating
any non-pure cell when it is associated with such a q approaches 0. For a d in which y of Gk’s parent cells are
non-empty, and each of these parent cells is pure, BD(Gk,d) approaches 1
2y, since the likelihood of Gk with this
Dirichlet over its q generating data with a nonzero number of cases in the speciﬁc class cell (C=1 or C=2) of
each of the y ps that d ﬁlls approaches the probability of Dirichlet selecting for Gk the q which assigns to each
ps Pr{C = 1|ps} approaching 0 or 1 in agreement with which of the ps class cells is nonempty in d. For each of
the y nonempty ps, this probability is 0.5 and independent of the other ps’s; hence, the joint for the y nonempty
psi having the correct Pr{C = 1|psi} or Pr{C = 2|psi} assigned a value approaching 1 is 1
2y. It thus follows that
when in d y parent states are nonempty, BD(Gk,d) approaches either 1
2y or 0.
¤
When considering the question of whether a random model, simple or complex, has a better chance of scoring
well, there are several factors that must be taken into account. Simpler random models score 1
2y for small y with
higher probability than complex random models, but complex random models have higher probability of ﬁtting
the data with class pure cells, and thus achieving nonzero scores. A comparison of the expected scores of random
complex and random simple models depends on the number of observations N in the data d, on the score (0 or
1
2y, 1 ≤ y ≤ min(2k,N) ) in question, and on the complexities k and k0 of the models, with several crossover points
characterizing this relationship.
264.3.2 The Lack of Coherence of BD with Vanishing a
While the analysis of a random model’s BD score distributions is both interesting and intricate, our primary
focus is the behavior of the evaluation ratio for BD scores, where the distribution of the BD scores of the true
model, and the inter-dependence of the BD scores of the models evaluated, are vital. Though the analysis depends
on what the true model is, we nevertheless are able to make some general conclusions regarding BD’s lack of
coherence.
We again associate with model structure G the simple, but natural symmetric q considered in Section 3.2
in the context of likelihood. Of course, here the q are unknown to the BD evaluation, which will continue to
assume a uniform Dirichlet (i.e., BDue with vanishing equivalent sample size a). The theorems which follow
demonstrate that, for these natural q, simple model structures are inappropriately favored over the complex. That
is, we demonstrate that simple model structures scoring the same BD score as complex model structures on the
same d have lower posterior probabilities, a result that holds even under uniform priors on model complexity, the
uniform BDue Dirichlet priors over Q, and symmetric and homomorphic actual q. Thus, even in the simplest and
most homogeneous of model spaces, BD does not exhibit complexity coherence. Since more varied families of q
would often contain as subfamilies these trivial q, the non-coherence of BD demonstrated here applies widely.
Theorem 4.2: Let BD be evaluated with respect to a Dirichlet prior with uniform apv with vanishing equivalent
sample size a. Let Gk have q = 2k cells, and Gk0 have q0 = 2k0
cells, 1 ≤ k < k0. Let associated qk and qk0 be
symmetric, assigning conditional class probabilities pr = 1.0, and hence the models are homomorphic. For any
nonzero scores v = 1
2y, 1 < y ≤ q, and v0 = 1
2y0 , 1 < y0 ≤
q0
2 ,
Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ v | Gk, qk truth}
Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ v | Gk0, qk0 truth and BD(Gk0,d) ≈ v0}
=
1
µ
(q0
2 −1)( q0
2 −2)...( q0
2 −(y0−1))
(q0)y0−1
¶ +e.
for e positive and approaching 0 as |d| increases.
Proof: The numerator is:
Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ 1/2y | Gk, qk truth}
= ( Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ 1/2y | Gk, qk truth and has y ps touched in d}
∗ Pr{Gk has y ps touched in d | Gk, qk truth} )
= ( Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ 1/2y | Gk, qk truth and has y ps touched in d}
∗ Pr{|d| = N cases touch y of q = 2k cells ps given uniform placement} )
= (Pr{each of the y nonempty ps in Gk is class pure | Gk, qk truth and has y ps touched in d}
∗ Pr{|d| = N cases touch y of q = 2k cells ps given uniform placement} )
The denominator is:
Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ 1/2y | Gk0, qk0 truth and BD(Gk0,d) ≈ 1/2y0
}
27= ( Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ 1/2y | Gk0, qk0 truth, BD(Gk0,d) ≈ 1/2y0
and Gk has y ps touched in d}
∗ Pr{Gk has y ps touched in d | Gk0, qk0 truth, BD(Gk0,d) ≈ 1/2y0
} )
= ( Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ 1/2y | Gk0 qk0 truth, BD(Gk0,d) ≈ 1/2y0
and Gk has y ps touched in d}
∗ Pr{|d| = N cases touch y of q = 2k cells ps given uniform placement} )
= (Pr{each of the y nonempty ps in Gk is class pure | Gk0, qk0 truth,BD(Gk0,d) ≈ 1/2y0
and Gk has y ps touched in d}
∗ Pr{|d| = N cases touch y of q = 2k cells ps given uniform placement} )
After cancellation in the numerator and denominator of the common factor5
Pr{|d| = N cases touch y of q = 2k cells ps given uniform placement}
we are left with
Pr{each of the y nonempty ps in Gk is class pure | Gk, qk truth and has y ps touched in d}
Pr{each of the y nonempty ps in Gk is class pure | Gk0, qk0 truth,BD(Gk0,d) ≈ 1/2y0 and Gk has y ps touched in d}
The numerator is 1 since Gk, qk truth means each Gk cell is pure, since qk assigns pr = 1.0.
Consider now the denominator. Gk0 achieves its score only if d touches y0 cells of Gk0. Each of these y0 cells
ps induces a class distribution of either Pr{C = 1|ps} = 1 or Pr{C = 2|ps} = 1, since qk0 assigns pr = 1.0. If
these y0 cells mix the class assigned pr = 1, for sufﬁciently large d, the probability that BD(Gk,d) ≈ 1
2y is e (for
e > 0, vanishingly small), since Gk is random and d contains cases with a mix of classes (at least approximately
1
y0 fraction of the cases in d are of the minority class). In the case that the y0 touched cells of Gk0 are either all
Pr{C = 1|ps} = 1 or Pr{C = 2|ps} = 1, BD(Gk,d) ≈ 1
2y with probability 1, since in this case d contains cases
of only one of the classes. The probability that all y0 touched cells of Gk0 are either all Pr{C = 1|ps} = 1 or
Pr{C = 2|ps} = 1 is given by
(
q0
2 −1)(
q0
2 −2)...(
q0
2 −(y0−1))
(q0)
y0−1
since we are assuming qk0 is symmetric and hence there are
q0
2 of each type of parent cell. That is, after the ﬁrst of
the y0 cells is touched, this expression is the probability that the remaining y0−1 touched cells of Gk0 come from
the remaining (
q0
2 −1) same class parent cells of Gk0 as the ﬁrst.
¤
When y0 = 2 (the Gk0 model score approaches v0 = 1
22), the denominator of the ratio for Gk for any nonzero
scores v = 1
2y, 1 < y ≤ q, that Gk approaches reduces to
( q0
2 −1)
q0 + e
At q0 = 2 (i.e., k0 = 1) this is e, and increases monotonically in q0, bounded above by 1
2. More generally, we have
the following.
Lemma 4.2: For k0 ≥ 1 (and thus q0 ≥ 2) and score v0 = 1
2y0 that Gk0 approaches for y0 in the range 1 < y0 ≤
q0
2 ,
the denominator
(
q0
2 −1)(
q0
2 −2)...(
q0
2 −(y0−1))
(q0)
y0−1 + e
5Feller [5], page 102 Eq (2.4), gives an expression for this occupancy problem, but apparently no tractable closed from is known.
28of the Gk ratio for any nonzero score v = 1
2y that Gk approaches is increasing in q0, from e at q0 = 2, approaching
1
2y0−1 as q0 (and thus k0) increases.
Consequently, we have our main result regarding the non-coherence of BD scores. If on any d for which a
pair of models differing only in complexity approach a common score of v = 1
2y, the more complex model has a
higher ratio and, assuming uniform model structure priors P(G), a higher true posterior conditioned on such a d.
Theorem 4.3: Let BD be evaluated with respect to a Dirichlet prior with uniform apv with vanishing equivalent
sample size a. Let Gk have q = 2k cells, and Gk0 have q0 = 2k0
cells, 1 ≤ k < k0. Let the associated qk and qk0 be
symmetric, assigning conditional class probabilities pr = 1.0, and hence the models are homomorphic. For any
nonzero score v = 1
2y, 1 < y ≤
q
2, and d sufﬁciently large,
Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ v | Gk, qk truth}
Pr{d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ v | Gk0, qk0 truth and BD(Gk0,d) ≈ v}
<
Pr{d such that BD(Gk0,d) ≈ v | Gk0, qk0 truth}
Pr{d such that BD(Gk0,d) ≈ v | Gk, qk truth and BD(Gk,d) ≈ v}
Proof: The result follows immediately from Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.2. That is, taking y = y0 and thus v =
v0 = 1
2y = 1
2y0 , Theorem 4.2 implies the left-hand-side ratios is
1
µ
(q0
2 −1)( q0
2 −2)...( q0
2 −(y−1))
(q0)y−1
¶ +e1
while the right-hand-side ratio is
1
³
(q
2−1)( q
2−2)...( q
2−(y−1))
qy−1
´ +e2
Since q0 > q, Lemma 4.2 implies the left-hand-side denominator is greater than the right-hand-side denominator,
and hence the left-hand-side ratio is smaller than the right-hand-side ratio.
¤
Assuming equal model priors, we have also that
Pr{Gk, qk truth | d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ v and BD(Gk0,d) ≈ v}
< Pr{Gk0, qk0 truth | d such that BD(Gk,d) ≈ v and BD(Gk0,d) ≈ v}
As noted in Section 3.1, this pairwise lack of coherence implies that there is at least one d in the intersection of
the sets of data on which Gk and Gk0 each scores v such that the posteriors are ordered as above, conditioned on
this d. That is, from the pairwise inconsistency, we know there must exist at least one d such that the posteriors
conditioned fully on this d is inconsistent with the BD scores on this d.
Example 4.3 The following numerical results show how pronounced the non-coherence can be, demonstrating
that complex models (G5 ∈ card5) scoring the same good BD score (v = 1
2y, for small y) on a common d as simple
models (G3 ∈ card3) have signiﬁcantly higher ratios, and hence higher posteriors on such d. While Theorem
4.3 describes the behavior for d sufﬁciently large, the following results show a pronounced complexity bias even
when d is size only 10 cases. We compute results for symmetric q assigning pr = 0.8, as well as the pr = 1.0
29case covered by the theorem. The probabilities below are estimated from generation of 100 million d for each of
the two illustrations (pr = 1.0 and pr = 0.8), and we report ratios for the best scores v = 1
2y (i.e., the lowest y) for
which either there is at least one di generated such that
BD(G3,di) ≈ 1
2y and BD(G5,di) ≈ 1
2y when G3 truth
or there is at least one dj generated such that
BD(G3,dj) ≈ 1
2y and BD(G5,dj) ≈ 1
2y when G5 truth
pr = 1.0
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/24 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/24 | G5 truth and BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/24} ≈ 6.159124
Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/24 | G5 truth} / Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/24 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/24} ≈ 45.166910
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/25 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/25 | G5 truth and BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/25} ≈ 11.181197
Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/25 | G5 truth} / Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/25 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/25} ≈ 27.578595
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/26 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/26 | G5 truth and BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/26} ≈ 10.036237
Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/26 | G5 truth} / Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/26 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/26} ≈ 17.942872
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/27 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/27 | G5 truth and BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/27} ≈ 6.793580
Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/27 | G5 truth} / Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/27 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/27} ≈ 9.601065
pr = 0.8
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/25 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/25 | G5 truth and BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/25} ≈ 1.893928
Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/25 | G5 truth} / Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/25 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/25} ≈ 3.248872
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/26 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/26 | G5 truth and BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/26} ≈ 2.339007
Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/26 | G5 truth} / Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/26 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/26} ≈ 3.255562
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/27 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/27 | G5 truth and BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/27} ≈ 2.142916
Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/27 | G5 truth} / Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/27 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/27} ≈ 2.626725
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/28 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/28 | G5 truth and BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/28} ≈ 1.769336
Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/28 | G5 truth} / Pr{BD(G5,d) ≈ 1/28 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/28} ≈ 1.961687
While Theorem 4.3 and the numerical results above demonstrate a non-coherence for equal BD scores, Theo-
rem 4.2 further implies that for symmetric q assigning pr =1.0 there exist k <k0 and y <y0 such that the Gk score
approaches 1
2y and the Gk0 score approaches 1
2y0 (i.e., Gk achieves a BD score strictly better than Gk0) on some d,
yet Gk0 has a far larger ratio and hence a far larger posterior (assuming equal model priors) than does Gk. For
example, comparing G1 (and hence q = 2) with G3 (and hence q0 = 8) when the G1 score approaches 1
22 and the
G3 score approaches 1
23, we compute from Theorem 4.2 that G1’s ratio is is approximately 1
(3∗2)
64
while G3’s ratio
grows arbitrarily large with |d|.
Even for d of size only 10, we obtain from a generation of 100 million such di and a symmetric q assigning
pr = 1.0 the following results.
Pr{BD(G1,d) ≈ 1/22 | G1 truth} / Pr{BD(G1,d) ≈ 1/22 | G3 truth and BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/23} ≈ 6.927846
Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/23 | G3 truth} / Pr{BD(G3,d) ≈ 1/23 | G1 truth and BD(G1,d) ≈ 1/22} ≈ 170.369936
Consequently, assuming equal model structure priors, the model posteriors behave as
Pr{G1, q1 truth | d such that BD(G1,d) ≈ v and BD(G3,d) ≈ v0}
< Pr{G3, q3 truth | d such that BD(G1,d) ≈ v and BD(G3,d) ≈ v0}
30for this pair v = 1
22, v0 = 1
23 of scores, with the posterior of the more complex G3 exceeding that of G1 by a factor
of greater than 24, despite being conditioned on the inferior BD score.
4.4 MDL Measures
Model evaluation measures derived from the MDL principle [21] attempt to balance a model’s ”ﬁt” to the data
with the model’s complexity. Since the measure of ﬁt — denoted below as MDLdata — correlates closely with the
apparent error rate measures analyzed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the complexity penalty terms of the MDL measure
— denoted below as MDLgraph and MDLtable – are well motivated. As the following analysis demonstrates,
however, the standard forms that this complexity penalty take are not sophisticated enough to ensure a coherent
evaluation in all situations.
Several similar versions of MDL have been proposed in the context of Bayesian networks and Bayesian net-
work classiﬁers. Since all share the same basic form, slight modiﬁcations to the following examples sufﬁce to
exhibit similar non-coherence for the most commonly employed variants. The general form of the MDL score
applied to a Bayesian network M =< G,q > is
MDL(M,d) = DLgraph(M)+DLtable(M,d)+DLdata(M,d)
We perform the evaluations below with the speciﬁc MDL realization used by Friedman and Goldszmidt [7]. Ap-
plied to our parent set network structure (where the only edges are from a subset of the features to the class node,
and all features and the class node are binary), the three terms of the score are given by:
DLgraph(M) = log2F + log2(
µ
F
k
¶
)
DLtable(M,d) = 1
2 ∗ 2k ∗ log2N
DLdata(M,d) = −åpvNpv ∗ log2(
Npv
Np )
where F is the number of features (not including the class node, which is not available to be its own parent), k
is the number of parents in M of the class node, N = |d| is the number of observations in d, and Np and Npv
are deﬁned following (4) in the context of the BD metric. As we did for BD and simple likelihood, the above
restricts the MDL score to the score on the class node, since, again, the score on feature nodes does not vary
across different parent set networks. Note that MDL(M,d) does not depend on M(q), nor on a prior distribution
over Q.
The very similar MDL formulation of Lam and Bacchus [14] replaces the term DLgraph with k ∗ log2(F).
The details differ only slightly, and, since in both versions the DLgraph term grows when either F or k grows, the
same non-coherence demonstrated in the following example is seen in either formulation.
Example 4.3: We specify problem parameters so that a complex model has a higher (worse) MDL score than
a simpler model, yet the complex model has a higher evaluation ratio, and thus a higher posterior conditioned
on these scores, assuming uniform model priors. Let there be F = 1000 features, and data d of size N = 10
observations. We compare homomorphic models of complexities k = 1 and k0 = 2, with symmetric q assigning
pr = 0.7. We compute as follows MDL score components DLgraph and DLtable, which do not depend on the data
(beyond its size N):
M1 ∈ card1: DLgraph = 19.931569, DLtable = 3.321928, DLgraph+DLtable = 23.253497
M2 ∈ card2: DLgraph = 28.895909, DLtable = 6.643856, DLgraph+DLtable = 35.539765
When a card2 model M2 ﬁts the data perfectly (only class-pure parent cells), DLdata =0 and hence MDL(M2,d)=
35.539765. A card1 model M1 incurs a DLdata score of 9.709506 and hence MDL(M1,d) = 32.963003 when it
ﬁts the data with an even class-split pattern, such as ps1 = (3 Class1, 2 Class2), ps2 = (2 Class1, 3 Class2), in
its two parent cells. Letting v = 32.963003 and v0 = 35.539765, we compare the ratio on data d for which M1
achieves v and M2 simultaneously achieves v0. Despite the fact that M1’s score is better, probabilities estimated
from 10 million generated di of 10 observations each show the ratio for M2 to be 10 times higher than the ratio
31for M1. Speciﬁcally, the estimates produced from the 10 million di are:
Pr{MDL(M1,d) = v | M1 truth}
Pr{MDL(M1,d) = v | M2 truth, MDL(M2,d) = v0}
≈
0.04827380
0.07393976
= 0.652880
Pr{MDL(M2,d) = v0 | M2 truth}
Pr{MDL(M2,d) = v0 | M1 truth, MDL(M1,d) = v}
≈
0.05013270
0.007449175
= 6.729966
The values are stable over several sets of 10 million runs each. The implication is that, when these models score
as speciﬁed (i.e. MDL(M1,d) < MDL(M2,d), so M1 scores better), M2 is greater than 10 times more likely to be
the true model, assuming equal model priors, i.e., for these v < v0 (M1 achieves the better MDL score v)
Pr{M1 truth | MDL(M1,d) = v and MDL(M2,d) = v0}
< Pr{M2 truth | MDL(M1,d) = v and MDL(M2,d) = v0}
¤
One might consider whether a complexity coherent variant of MDL scoring could be devised. Note ﬁrst that
the DLdata term by itself exhibits a non-coherence favoring complex models that is quite similar to the bias seen in
apparent error rate. For example, using the above parameters, except that the scores compared are for M1 and M2
each achieving DLdata = 0 (perfect ﬁt to the data), we ﬁnd that M1 has a ratio greater than three times that of M2
(254.926454 vs. 72.113131 where probabilities are again estimated from a generation of 10 million d, each with
10 observations). Thus, some term compensating for this complexity bias in DLdata is required if the measure is
to be complexity coherent. Consider, then, the general form
MDLY = pen(k)+DLdata,
with pen(k) increasing without bound in k, as does each of DLtable and DLgraph. Consider a generalization of
the original example in which M1 again ﬁts the data with an even class-split pattern, yielding an MDLY score of
v = pen(1)+9.709506. Consider Mk0 which ﬁt the data perfectly, for increasing k0, yielding DLdata = 0 and thus
an MDLY score of v0 = pen(k0). Note that, for sufﬁciently large k0, the term pen(k0) results in v0 > v. However,
the ratio for M1 is approximately 0.652880 when k0 = 2 and decreases as k0 increases (this poor DLdata score
is more likely when M1 is random than truth), while for Mk0, as k0 increases, the ratio for its perfect DLdata
score approaches 1.0 from above. Consequently, no such pen term can result in a coherent measure. It therefore
appears that DLdata would need to be combined with a rather sophisticated complexity adjustment term — one
that depends on the models’ DLdata scores as well as on the models’ complexities — if a complexity coherent
variant of MDL is to be obtained.
One conclusion for MDL in its standard form, and for BDue with vanishing equivalent sample size, is that if
these measures work well in practice, it may be explained by the fact that often applications possess a bias for the
true model to be simple.
5. Model Space Issues
5.1 Overview
The second dimension that must be accounted for in model evaluation is the model space. Even assuming
that a coherent evaluation measure EV is employed, there remain important issues that depend on characteristics
of the model space. Of interest here is how does the number of models in the space, or the number of models
evaluated, affect the interpretation of a coherent scoring function.
For concreteness, we assume here that likelihood L(M,d) is the evaluation function, under the scenario of
Section 3.2 that M(q) is known to L. Note that, by assuming a coherent scoring function, the structural char-
acteristics of the models evaluated (e.g., the complexity of the models) become irrelevant to selection, beyond
32what is captured in model priors P(M). If P(M) is uniform on the model space, then the number of models of
each complexity class cardk evaluated is irrelevant, and the total number of models in the space (or the number
of models examined) is the only factor to consider. Even if there are far more cardk0 models than cardk models
(for example, when k0 > k) evaluated, and even if the score of the best of the cardk0 models is better by only a
minuscule amount than that of the best of the cardk models, there is no reason to prefer the best cardk model (i.e.,
overﬁt or complexity avoidance is not justiﬁed). The coherence of the evaluation function and uniformity of P(M)
imply this. In particular, the appropriateness of any complexity-related score adjustment stems from evaluation
non-coherence rather than from properties of model space or of search.
Three results follow.
a) A priori, the true model has the highest distribution of likelihood scores, i.e., higher than any single random
model, before data is observed.
b) The probability that we can identify correctly the true model M∗ decreases as the number Q of models in
the space increases relative to the amount of data. This is captured in the collective a priori distributions
of likelihood scores for models in the space, and reﬂects on generalization error, though not on selection
criteria. While this result seems self-evident, it is valuable to quantify the |d| vs. Q tradeoff so as to
realize when we are in a hopeless situation, that no amount of ingenuity, such as sophisticated search or
re-sampling, can remedy.
c) In a space with Q models, if we evaluate W ≤ Q models, the probability of identifying the true model M∗
monotonically increases as W increases. The strength of M∗ — the certainty of the classiﬁcation given the
parentcell—determinestherateofincrease. Whilethismightnotappearsurprising, QuinlanandCameron-
Jones [20] and others have seemingly observed a contradictory non-nonmonotonic behavior referred to as
oversearching. There to our knowledge has not been developed an abstract analysis of the oversearch
phenomenon that is not obfuscated by details of a speciﬁc search strategy, or by potential shortcomings of
speciﬁc evaluation measures.
5.1 Assumptions
We continue under the assumptions speciﬁed in Section 3.1 which are summarized here for convenience.
a) Feature sets are disjoint. We continue to consider model-space issues when model interaction is trivial, so
as to factor out confounding effects in an attempt to gain insight into the intrinsic principles.
b) Every model M is associated with an M(q) which assigns conditional class probabilities of pr and 1−
pr symmetrically to the two classes, so the unconditional class probabilities are equal. As observed, the
assignment of a single, ﬁxed 0.5 ≤ pr ≤ 1.0 is sufﬁcient to capture, for example, a functional parent cell -
class relationship, with a noise process ﬂipping the class label with a single, ﬁxed probability.
c) Our focus continues to be on evaluation characteristics rather than on details of search. Thus, we continue
to assume that a model of a speciﬁed cardinality is chosen by an oracle for evaluation with equal probability
from among models with nonzero prior probability.
5.2 Distribution of Likelihood Scores
As is recapped in Fact 3.1 of Section 3.1, and Theorem 3.1 linking likelihood to posterior, given any d, the
model with the highest likelihood on d is most likely to be truth, assuming uniform model priors. While this
governs model posterior after d has been observed (i.e., posterior conditioned on d), Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 derive
the a priori distribution of likelihood scores:
33Pr{d such that L(M,d) = prH ∗ (1− pr)
(N−H) | M true} =
µ
N
H
¶
∗ (prH ∗(1− pr)(N−H))
Pr{d such that L(M,d) = prH ∗ (1− pr)
(N−H) | M random} =
µ
N
H
¶
∗ 0.5N
for 0 ≤ H ≤ N, where N = |d|. Further, Theorem 3.4 establishes that (when q is symmetric, as is assumed here)
knowledge of the true model’s identity, or of any model’s likelihood score L(M,d), does not affect the distribution
of another model’s score L(M0,d).
It follows from the a priori score distributions for random and true models that true model M∗ has its scores
distributed strictly higher than any other single model in model space, provided only that the pr assigned by M∗(q)
is other than 0.5.
Theorem 5.1: The cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the true model’s likelihood scores, except for
equality at the upper extreme score, is everywhere below the CDF for any random model’s scores, provided that
the true model’s pr 6= 0.5. That is,
Pr{d such that L(M∗,d) ≤ prH ∗ (1− pr)
(N−H) | M∗ true}
< Pr{d such that L(M,d) ≤ prH ∗ (1− pr)
(N−H) | M random}
for all 0 ≤ H < N, with equality at H = N.
Proof: Since pr 6= 0.5, pr > 0.5 since, by our convention, pr ≥ (1− pr). Consider ﬁrst the relationship between
prH ∗(1− pr)
N−H and 0.5N
when pr > 0.5. At H = 0 we have
(1− pr)
N < (0.5)N
while at H = N we have
prN > 0.5N
Since prH ∗(1− pr)
N−H is increasing in H, it follows that there exists some T, 0 < T ≤ N, such that for all
0 ≤ q < T
prq∗(1− pr)
(N−q) ≤ (0.5)N
and for all T ≤ k ≤ N,
prk ∗(1− pr)
(N−k) > (0.5)
N
It follows from Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 that
Pr{d such that L(M∗,d) ≤ prH ∗ (1− pr)
(N−H) | M∗ true} = å
H
k=0
µ
N
k
¶
∗ (prk ∗(1− pr)
(N−k))
Pr{d such that L(M,d) ≤ prH ∗ (1− pr)
(N−H) | M random} = å
H
k=0
µ
N
k
¶
∗ 0.5N
If 0 ≤ H < T (where T is as identiﬁed above), then every term of the true model’s summation is less than or
equal to the corresponding term of the random model’s summation, and at the ﬁrst term (k = 0) of the summa-
tions, the random model’s term is strictly larger. If T ≤ H < N, re-write the expansion of the two CDF’s as
1.0 − å
N
k=H+1
µ
N
k
¶
∗ (prk ∗(1− pr)
(N−k)) and
1.0 − å
N
k=H+1
µ
N
k
¶
∗ 0.5N
Each of these terms in the summation for the true model is larger than the corresponding term in the summation
for the random model, hence establishing the relationship between the CDF’s for all 0 ≤ H < N. At H = N, both
CDF’s evaluate to 1.0.
34¤
Observe that differential in the CDF’s at any point 0 ≤ H < N increases as pr approaches 1.0, and is indepen-
dent of model complexity.
5.3 How Probable is the Selection of the True Model?
This section considers how probable are we to select the true model if, after observing the data d, we select
the model with the highest posterior conditioned on d, which, of course, is the criterion that makes the selection
of the true model most probable after observing the data d. That is, we consider how likely is it, before observing
the data d, that the true model M∗ (which is to generate the data d) will have the highest posterior conditioned
on that data d and thus be correctly selected as being the true model. Since model priors are assumed equal, we
analyze this question in terms of likelihood scores L(M,d).
We ﬁrst assume that the true model is among the W that we evaluate, which would be the case, for example,
if we evaluated all the models in the model space. The next section utilizes this result to address the question of
how many models should we evaluate.
Suppose W models, the true model M∗ plus W −1 random models, are evaluated. We select as our guess
for truth the highest scoring model. If h models, 1 ≤ h ≤W, tie for the highest evaluation, assume each of these
h models has an equal 1
h chance of being selected by some tie breaking procedure — by our previous analysis,
these h models are equi-probable and cannot be distinguished. We wish to compute the a priori probability (be-
foredata isobserved)ofthisprocedure resultingintheselectionof thetruemodelM∗. Thatis, wewishtocompute
S(W)
= Pr{M∗ selected from the highest scoring models evaluated |W −1 random models and M∗ are evaluated}
=
W−1
å
r=0
Pr{M∗ and r of W −1 random models score highest}
(r+1)
Theorem 5.2:
S(W)
= Pr{M∗ selected from the highest scoring models evaluated |W −1 random models and M∗ are evaluated}
=
1
W
∗
N
å
k=0
Pr{M∗ scores vk}
ak
∗((bk+1)W −(bk)W)
where:
vk = prk ∗(1− pr)
N−k
ak = Pr{random model M scores vk}
bk = Pr{random model M scores less than vk}
Proof: Recall that q symmetric implies model scores are independent (Theorem 3.4). N is the number of cases in
d, and represents the exponent of the highest possible likelihood score, i.e., 0 ≤ k ≤ N, again assuming pr > 0.5.
Thus
S(W)
= å
N
k=0[P{M∗ scores vk}
∗å
W−1
r=0 ( 1
r+1 ∗ Pr{some r of W −1 random models score vk and none of
the remaing (W −1−r) random models score higher than vk−1})
35]
Note b0 = 0 and bN+1 = 1. Hence
S(W)
=
n
å
k=0
(Pr{M∗ scores vk}∗
W−1
å
r=0
µ
W −1
r
¶
∗[ak
r ∗bk
(W−1−r)]
r+1
)
Since
Ã
W −1
r
!
r+1 = 1
W ∗
µ
W
r+1
¶
, we can write
W−1
å
r=0
µ
W −1
r
¶
∗[ak
r ∗bk
(W−1−r)]
r+1
=
1
W
∗
W−1
å
r=0
(
µ
W
r+1
¶
∗[ak
r ∗bk
(W−1−r)])
Changing the limits of summation we obtain
1
W
∗
W−1
å
r=0
(
µ
W
r+1
¶
∗[ak
r ∗bk
(W−1−r)])
=
1
W
∗(
1
ak
∗
W
å
r=0
(
µ
W
r
¶
∗[ak
r ∗bk
(W−r)]) −
1
ak
∗(
µ
W
0
¶
∗[ak
0∗bk
W]))
=
1
W ∗ak
∗[(ak +bk)
W −bk
W], by the Binomial Theorem.
From the deﬁnitions of ak and bk, we have for 0 ≤ k ≤ N
(ak +bk)
= Pr{random model M scores vk}+Pr{random model M scores less than vk}
= Pr{random model M scores vk or less}
= bk+1
Hence, we may write
1
W ∗ak
∗[(ak +bk)
W −bk
W]
=
1
W ∗ak
∗[bk+1
W −bk
W]
and thus
S(W)
36=
1
W
∗
N
å
k=0
Pr{M∗ scores vk}
ak
∗((bk+1)W −(bk)W)
¤
Note that with all parameters butW held ﬁxed, the probability S(W) is decreasing asW increases, since M∗ is
assumed to be among the W models evaluated, regardless of how large this numberW is.
We ﬁrst apply the expression for S(W) to the situation where Q =W, meaning that we evaluate all models in
the space, and we wish to analyze, for various values of the parameters |d| and pr, how the probability of selecting
M∗ decreases as the size W = Q of the model space increases. Figures 1 (a)-(d) plot log10(W) vs. log10(S(W)),
where, recall,
S(W) = Pr{M∗ selected from the highest scoring models evaluated |W −1 random models and M∗ are evaluated}
The four plots are for true models M∗ with pr=0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9, respectively. Each plot displays a curve for
each of the three sizes of d, N=20, 60, and 100 observations. For example, we see from Figure 1(b) that when true
model M∗ assigns pr = 0.7 and the model space contains Q = 106 models, and when data is to contain N = 60
observations, the a priori probability that M∗ will be correctly identiﬁed then is 0.0387 = log10(−1.412362),
assuming all models are to be evaluated. Note that since the number of models in the space often is exponential
in the number of features, in many high dimensional applications, the data relative to the size of the model space
generally is far sparser than what the plotted values specify. These plots thus indicate the upper limits of when
there is reasonable probability of correctly identifying the true model M∗.
5.4 How Many Models Should We Evaluate?
When we evaluate W out of Q models, the probability that M∗ is among the W evaluated is W
Q, assuming
models are chosen uniformly for evaluation. While we can select M∗ as the true model only if it is among the
W we evaluate, the probability, given that M∗ is among the W we evaluate, that M∗ also is among the r highest
models evaluated and then is selected rather than one of the r−1 random models (0 ≤ r ≤ W) with the same
maximal score decreases asW increases. How do these competing forces trade-off against each other?
Let PSelect(W) = Pr{M∗ is selected from among the W we evaluate}. Then
PSelect(W)
= Pr{M∗ among the W we evaluate}
∗ Pr{M∗ selected from the highest scoring models evaluated | M∗ among the W we evaluate}
= Pr{M∗ among the W we evaluate}
∗ Pr{M∗ selected fromthe highest scoring models evaluated |W −1 random models and M∗ are evaluated}
= W
Q ∗S(W),
where S(W) is as deﬁned and derived in the previous section.
Theorem 5.3: If all q are symmetric and assign pr 6= 0.5, then
PSelect(W) = W
Q ∗S(W) is strictly increasing in W, that is, the more models evaluated the higher the probability
that the true model M∗ is selected.
Proof: Since pr 6= 0.5, pr > 0.5 since, by our convention, pr ≥ (1− pr). For W > 0, let Incl(W) = W
Q and thus
Pselect(W) = Incl(W)∗S(W). The strategy is to show
PSelect(W)
PSelect(W −1)
=
Incl(W)∗S(W)
Incl(W −1)∗S(W −1)
> 1, for W > 1.
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Figure 1: Effect of number of models Q in space on probability S(W) of selecting M∗, assuming all models are
evaluated (i.e., Q=W), for various numbers N of observations and model strengths pr. Plots are log10 vs. log10 .
38Incl(W)
Incl(W −1)
=
W
Q
W−1
Q
=
W
W −1
and, from Theorem 5.2, the ﬁrst factor of
S(W)
S(W −1)
is
1
W
1
W−1
=
W −1
W
, so the result follows iff
å
N
k=0(
Pr{M∗ scores vk}
ak ∗ [(bk+1)W −(bk)
W])
å
N
k=0(
Pr{M∗ scores vk}
ak ∗ [(bk+1)W−1−(bk)
W−1])
> 1.0, for W > 1.
It follows from Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 that, for each k,
Pr{M∗ scores vk}
ak
=
µ
N
k
¶
∗(prk ∗(1− pr)
N−k)
µ
N
k
¶
∗(0.5)
N
Hence, after cancellation of the
µ
N
k
¶
terms and the constant (0.5)
N, the result follows iff
å
N
k=0(prk ∗(1− pr)
N−k) ∗ [(bk+1)W −(bk)
W]
å
N
k=0(prk ∗(1− pr)
N−k) ∗ [(bk+1)W−1−(bk)
W−1]
> 1.0, for W > 1.
Consider the sum for a given exponent m:
å
N
k=0(prk ∗(1− pr)
N−k) ∗ [(bk+1)m−(bk)
m])
Association of the terms yields the telescoping sum
−(pr0∗(1− pr)
N ∗b0
m)
+(å
N
k=1(pr(k−1)∗(1− pr)
N−(k−1) − prk ∗(1− pr)
(N−k))∗bk
m)
+(prN ∗(1− pr)
0∗bN+1
m)
b0 = 0, so the ﬁrst term −(pr0∗(1− pr)
N ∗b0
m) is 0.
bN+1 = 1, so the ﬁnal term (prN ∗(1− pr)
0∗bN+1
m) = prN and does not depend on the exponent m.
Each of the middle terms
(pr(k−1)∗(1− pr)
N−(k−1) − prk ∗(1− pr)
(N−k))∗bk
m
is less than 0 provided pr >0.5 (and is 0 at pr =0.5). Since bk <1 (k ≤N), increasing the exponent m diminishes
bk
m and hence increases the total sum. Therefore,
å
N
k=0(prk ∗(1− pr)
N−k) ∗ [(bk+1)W −(bk)
W]
å
N
k=0(prk ∗(1− pr)
N−k) ∗ [(bk+1)W−1−(bk)
W−1]
> 1, for W > 1.
establishing the theorem.
¤
The Quinlan Cameron-Jones [20] oversearch result thus cannot materialize in this scenario of a coherent
measure. We conjecture that the monotonicity result continues to hold in many other scenarios, provided that a
coherent evaluation is used. Note that Theorem 5.3 implies also that the number of models of each complexity
that are evaluated is irrelevant, since a coherent evaluation measure is unaffected by model complexity.
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Figure 2: Effect of number of modelsW evaluated on probability PSelect(W) of selecting M∗, assuming a model
space of size Q=107, for various numbers N of observations and model strengths pr. Plots are log10 vs. log10 .
Figures 2 (a)-(d) plot log10(W) vs. log10(PSelect(W)), where, recall,
PSelect(W) = Pr{M∗ is selected from among the W we evaluate}
Here, the size Q of the model space is held ﬁxed at 107, and pr and N are varied as in Figure 1. The plots indicate
that for strong models (pr near 1.0) and relatively large data sets there is a nearly linear increase in Pselect(W)
as W increases. For weaker models and relatively sparser data, the probability of selecting the true model grows
sublinearly as the number W of models evaluated increases.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
We have deﬁned a notion of coherence for a model evaluation measure. A violation of coherence implies
that a measure’s evaluations may result in inconsistent model selection with respect to actual model posterior.
We study in particular violations of complexity coherence, where models differing only in their complexities
experience a non-coherent evaluation. We demonstrate that the common evaluation measures apparent error rate
(cross validated and not), the BDue metric with vanishing equivalent sample size, and standard MDL scoring are
not complexity coherent.
40Our results are in general agreement with Schaffer [23]. If a coherent evaluation measure is used, overﬁt
avoidance is justiﬁed only if there is an a priori preference for simple models to be true more often than complex
models. However, one of our central tenets is that if the non-coherent apparent error rate is used, there is a
bias for complex models to score well, and a complexity adjustment in such cases is appropriate, independent of
distributional assumptions on model complexity.
The model space results presented in Section 5 demonstrate that when a coherent measure such as data like-
lihood is used, the oversearch phenomenon described by Quinlan and Cameron-Jones [20] cannot occur. The
more models evaluated by a coherent measure, the higher the probability that the true model will be selected,
regardless of the complexities of the models evaluated. This result suggests that the evaluation criteria utilized in
experiments where oversearch has been observed may be non-coherent. However, in work such as [20], Laplace
error is used to evaluate individual rules, not complete classiﬁcation trees, each of whose leaves corresponds to
individual rules, and it is not immediately clear how to assess the coherence of the resulting evaluation procedure
in the context of the model selection problem.
There also is a relationship between our results and Occam razor and PAC learning generalization results. A
hypothesis that encodes the training labels with (for example) zero errors is akin to a probability model incurring
zero apparent training errors, and, similarly, to achieving a perfect DLdata term of MDL. Since our results show
each of these evaluation measures to be non-coherent, both theories produce weaker generalization bounds (in our
terms, less chance of the model being true) when models of increasing complexity are considered. However, it
should be noted that the Occam razor and PAC results derive from the dependence between generalization bounds
and the number of models of each complexity which exist, whereas our results derive from the interaction between
the complexity of a single model and noncoherent evaluation measures.
An area for future research is to investigate how the evaluation ratio can be used as a correction factor for non-
coherentmeasures, andhowthecorrectioncorrelateswithexistingfactors, suchasthosesuppliedbystructuralrisk
minimization [29], the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [22], and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
[24]. As we observed at the conclusion of Section 3.3, a p-value-like correction based solely on score distributions
of random models is potentially misleading, but utilizing fully the evaluation ratio appears promising.
We are exploring the effect of relaxing some of our model assumptions. Allowing multiple class conditional
probabilities pri simply moves the distributions from binomials to the more complicated multinomials, but in most
cases does not alter the results in any fundamental way. On the other hand, relaxing the disjoint and uncorrelated
feature set assumption makes many of the analyses considerably more intricate. Non-truth models are no longer
random (though, in a large space, ”almost all” models other than M∗ would remain random), since features shared
or correlated with M∗’s features would correlate with the class label. In such a model space, the interaction with
search becomes important. How would the application of directed search (e.g., greedy or beam search) interact
with evaluation measures and our current conclusions regarding the model space and the a priori probability of
selecting the true model M∗?
We are exploring also modiﬁcations to some of the non-coherent evaluation measures considered here. In
addition to the modiﬁcations to MDL discussed at the conclusion of Section 4.4, the BD metric can be studied
under other values for the Dirichlet parameters. For example, Steck [26] considers the behavior of the Dirichlet
distribution for a range of equivalent sample sizes a. Also, the non-likelihood equivalent K2 metric [10], in
which all parameters apv are assigned the value 1.0, can be considered. While it is not immediately clear how the
resulting evaluation measures will behave with respect to complexity coherence, it is clear that as the equivalent
samplesizegrows, biasesfordistributionsqofoneformoveranotherwillincreaseinstrength, presentingpotential
evaluation anomalies of their own.
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